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Abstract
Incentive contracts and monitoring by boards o f directors and blockholders are
alternative internal mechanisms to ensure that managers act in the interests of
shareholders.

Most

prior research

on compensation

and

performance

ignores

endogeneity among board, ownership and compensation structure (mix o f pay) variables.
Ignoring the endogeneity leads to inconsistent parameter estimates. I address the
endogeneity problem by using a simultaneous equations model. The three equations in
the system are mix o f pay, compensation and performance.
The results are consistent with efficient contracting. Mix o f pay depends on
characteristics o f the firm and alternative governance mechanisms. The relation between
stockholders and debtholders affects the relation between managers and stockholders.
Financial leverage has a significant effect on mix o f pay.
Compensation and performance equations show that mix o f pay is endogenous
and belongs in both equations as an explanatory variable. Mix o f pay is significantly
positive in the compensation equation, consistent with the prediction that higher
incentive based compensation leads to higher compensation risk and hence higher
compensation. Neither mix o f pay nor the board and ownership variables is significant in
the performance equation, suggesting that firms choose optimal combinations of
governance mechanisms. The direct effect o f regulation on compensation reported in
prior studies is spurious. The evidence provided shows that this effect is caused by
omitting mix o f pay from the compensation equation.
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1.

Introduction
Agency relations between managers and stockholders are widely researched in

accounting, economics and finance. Many studies examine the effectiveness of incentive
mechanisms by studying the relations among mix of pay, compensation, performance,
management turnover, ownership, and board structure. 1
Empirical investigations into the effectiveness o f incentive mechanisms contain
contradictory findings. Switches in signs o f variables and/or changes in their significance
are commonly observed. Interpretations o f the results also conflict in some cases. For
example, compensation studies that find a positive association between percentage of
outside directors on the board and compensation interpret their finding as indicating
failure o f boards dominated by outsiders. On the other hand, other studies that find a
positive price reaction to the appointment o f outside board members, or a positive
association between percentage o f outside board members and performance, interpret
their results as consistent with the effectiveness o f boards dominated by outside
directors. In reality, either boards are effective or not. The same board cannot be
effective and ineffective at the same time.
The logical implications o f some prior studies are bothersome. Arguments such
as, high CEO ownership is better than low CEO ownership, or having more insiders on

1

Mix of pay is used to refer to compensation structure. It is defined as non-salary (i.e., total
compensation - salary) divided by total compensation, expressed as a percentage. Incentive based
compensation and incentive contracts are interchangeably used with mix of pay.

1
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the board is better than having more outsiders on the board because they lead to low
compensation and/or high performance are problematic for two reasons.
First, such reasoning suggests that there is a unique ownership, board structure
and incentive contract that is suitable to all firms. This precludes substitution across
different mechanisms as a way to resolve agency conflicts. If ownership, governance and
compensation mechanisms are substitutes or complements, firms will choose a mix o f
mechanisms that equates marginal costs and marginal benefits across mechanisms. These
tradeoffs are likely to vary with firms’ circumstances. In this case, there is no unique
correct package o f mechanisms; different combinations o f the mechanisms are optimal
for different firms. For example, it might be optimal for a small firm with higher
percentage o f inside ownership to opt for lower percentage o f outside directors and less
use o f incentive contracts. A large firm with low inside ownership and a larger
percentage o f outside directors might use more incentive based compensation.
Empirically, the key question is, what is the cross sectional relation between margins and
mechanisms?
Second, such conclusions are inconsistent with the notions o f market efficiency
and efficient contracting. In an informationally efficient market, any deviations from the
optimal governance structure or any move towards it should be quickly reflected in price
at the time the change becomes known. If so, there should not be any relation between
the known governance structure and subsequent firm performance. Most o f the recent
findings in the empirical research, however, contradict this. For example, Core et al.
(1999) report a negative association between predicted excess compensation and future

2
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performance (one, three and five years return).2 This implies that the market takes three
to five years to impound information about observable variables, such as board and
ownership structure, in price. This is inconsistent with market efficiency.
The main goal o f this paper is to explain the inconsistencies in the literature. The
theory in section two incorporates the agency relation o f stockholders with debtholders
into the analysis, and develops implications o f efficient contracting that have been largely
ignored in empirical work. An important implication o f efficient contracting is that all
agency relations, ownership, and governance mechanisms within the firm should be
treated jointly. The study addresses this jointness directly using simultaneous estimation.
Agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Holmstrom (1979), suggests mix o f
pay as one o f the mechanisms to resolve the agency problem between managers and
shareholders. The theory also indicates that mix o f pay imposes compensation risk on
risk averse managers and hence leads to higher expected compensation. Mix o f pay
therefore belongs in both the compensation and performance equations. Most prior
research that examines the effect o f the governance system o f corporations does not
include mix o f pay in the compensation and performance equations; there is a correlated
omitted variable.
Papers by Core et al. (1999) and Mehran (1995) provide cogent illustrations o f
the source o f the conflicting results. These papers examine the effect of including mix o f

2

Predicted excess compensation is calculated by multiplying the estimated coefficients for board and
ownership characteristics variables by their respective values at the end of period for which the
compensation equation is estimated.
3
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pay in a compensation and performance equation respectively. Core et al. (1999) find
that mix o f pay and compensation are significantly positively related. They interpret this
as evidence o f governance failure. However, this finding is also consistent with efficient
contracting predictions that a risky pay package leads to higher compensation.
Mehran (1995) documents a significantly positive effect o f mix o f pay on
performance. He interprets this as supporting the incentive alignment role o f mix of pay.
However, this should not lead to conclusions that low mix o f pay is undesirable. Having
low mix o f pay may be optimal for firms that have access to other mechanisms to resolve
the agency conflict. What matters is not having more or less o f one mechanism, but
having an optimal mix o f mechanisms.
While addressing the correlated omitted variables problem by including mix o f
pay in the compensation and performance equations, the Mehran (1995) and Core et al.
(1999) studies, however, create endogeneity problems. To illustrate further, consider
Core et al. (1999) in more detail. They run two set o f equations. The first equation is the
mix o f pay equation. Mix of pay is a function o f some economic determinants, ownership
and board variables. That is, Mixofpay = f(x, y, z ) , where x is a vector o f economic
determinant variables, such as size, growth and volatility; y is a vector o f ownership
variables, such as CEO ownership, and the presence o f a five percent non-CEO insider; z
is a vector o f board variables, such as percentage o f inside directors, and board size. The
second equation is the compensation equation that relates compensation to its economic
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determinants,

ownership

and

board

variables

and

mix

of

pay.

That

is,

Compensation = g (x ,y ,z, f(x,y, z)) and all vectors are as defined above.

Consider replacing mix o f pay by the sum o f its estimated component and the
error term from the mix of pay equation. Substituting
compensation equation provides

f(x ,y ,z ) + e

into the

Compensation = g(x, y, z, f(x, y, z) + s ) . If z

is

correlated with compensation, then there is an endogeneity problem and ordinary least
squares estimates are biased and inconsistent.
To address endogeneity, a system o f equations is estimated using a sample o f 195
S&P 500 firms for 1993. The major findings are: (1) The use o f mix o f pay varies across
firms due to differences in economic characteristics, ownership and board structures.
Specifically, large firms and firms with older CEOs tend to use mix o f pay more. Firms
with higher leverage and CEO ownership tend to use incentive compensation less. (2)
Firms use governance mechanisms in a manner that is consistent with efficient
contracting. In compensation and performance equations that control for economic
determinants o f compensation and performance, and include mix o f pay as an
explanatory variable, none o f the governance variables except board size are found to be
significant. The significant negative effect o f board size on performance is a puzzle.
The remainder o f the paper is organized as follows: The next section develops
the efficient contracting theory that guides the remainder o f the paper. That section
focuses on fairly general concepts and abstracts from specific measurement details. The
theory is used in section three to examine the prior empirical literature to highlight

5

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

inconsistencies and puzzles. Section four extends the theory to address measurement
issues and provide sign predictions for coefficients. Section four also discusses sample
selection and data description. The primary results are in section five, and sensitivity
analyses are in section six. The final section provides a summary and conclusions.

6
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2.

Implications of Efficient Contracting for Agency Relations
There are two views of agency relations that are not mutually exclusive. The first

is that managers behave opportunistically because there are no effective mechanisms to
constrain their behavior. The second is that competitive pressures induce managers to
maximize the value o f the firm. This view reflects economic Darwinism; economic
survival requires discovering efficient ways to manage the firm This approach is known
as efficient contracting. Efficient contracting assumes that managers, shareholders, the
board o f directors and bondholders have incentives to maximize value, which requires
equating the marginal costs and marginal benefits o f alternative mechanisms to mitigate
agency problems.
Theories based on efficiency imply strong testable restrictions on agency relations
associated with the firm. Theories based on opportunism are less restrictive, since there
are myriad ways that opportunism can occur. While these two views o f the firm are not
mutually exclusive, it is useful to think o f them as extremes. The main emphasis o f this
section is on efficiency. The evaluation o f prior studies in section three leads naturally to
discussions o f opportunism, since most empirical studies present mixtures o f efficiency
and opportunism hypotheses.
Opportunism stems from the separation o f management from control that
characterizes modem corporations. Such separation caused economists to question the
viability o f the classical economics notion o f profit (value) maximization as the goal o f
firms. Some economists (for e.g., Berle and Means (1932)) argue that profit

7

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

maximization as the goal o f firms is not viable under separation because (i) self interest
driven managers may not choose actions compatible with the interests o f owners
(shareholders) and (ii) atomistic shareholders have neither the incentive nor the ability to
discipline managers (i.e., to make managers act in their (shareholders’) interest). This is
referred to as managerial opportunism or the self-serving management view o f the firm.
There is confusing use o f the term opportunism in the literature. Christie and
Zimmerman (1994) point out that one implication o f efficient contracting is that the only
observable opportunism is ex post unexpected opportunism. Subject to contracting
costs, opportunism expected ex ante is constrained by contracts. The empirical studies
evaluated in section three do not make this distinction.
As an extreme, viability of opportunism as a theory of the firm requires the
absence o f mechanisms and incentives to mitigate agency problems. However, such
mechanisms exist and there are incentives to use them to maximize value. Competition in
the labor market, Fama (1980); separation o f decision management from decision
control, (i.e., monitoring by board of directors, Fama and Jensen (1983)); concentrated
share ownership, Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); competition
in the product market, Hart (1983); incentive contracts, Jensen and Meckling (1976),
Holmstrom (1979); and corporate control, Jensen and Ruback (1983), are proposed as
ways to resolve the agency problem between managers and shareholders.
The remainder o f this section addresses the use o f capital structure, ownership,
compensation and corporate governance mechanisms to alleviate agency problems and
maximize value. While the primary emphasis in this section is on efficiency, it is

8
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important to understand that carrying any mechanism to mitigate agency costs to an
extreme can generate other agency problems. Each contractual mechanism has both
costs and benefits.
Debtholders have incentives to monitor managers’ compliance with debt
covenants. If

covenants are value increasing, monitoring by debtholders helps in

mitigating the agency problem between managers and shareholders. Debt, however,
creates another agency problem between shareholders and debtholders. Compensation
contracts are used as a precomitment device to minimize the agency cost o f debt and
hence leverage influences the extent to which mix o f pay is used by firms.
Ownership affects incentives to create value, and managers o f corporations rarely
have zero ownership. Non trivial ownership by managers means that managers are not
indifferent to firm value maximization. High managerial ownership provides an incentive
to maximize firm value. However, increased managerial ownership has costs. First, high
managerial ownership may lead to entrenchment if managers with higher ownership
levels wield more bargaining power with the board. ^ Second, managers have limited
wealth and hence there is a limit to the percentage o f the firm they can own. Moreover,
managers also demand diversification. With their human capital invested in a firm,
investing a large proportion o f their financial capital in the same firm leads managers to
be undiversified. This suggests that firms need to weigh the marginal costs and benefits
of increased managerial ownership.

3

See Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) for a detailed discussion on the impact of CEO power on the
independence and hence effectiveness of the board.

9
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Tying CEO compensation to firm performance is another way to motivate
managers to act in the interest of shareholders. Increasing the proportion o f performance
related compensation to total compensation, changing the mix o f pay, increases
incentives to maximize value. However, increasing the mix o f pay imposes compensation
risk on risk averse managers and hence may lead to higher expected compensation. Firms
need to balance the incentive alignment benefits o f increasing mix o f pay against the cost
o f inefficient risk sharing that it imposes.
Monitoring by large shareholders is yet another way to resolve the agency
problem. Characterizing corporations as being owned by atomistic shareholders, who
have little incentive to expend resources to monitor management (a free rider problem) is
incomplete. There are shareholders with high level(s) o f ownership who have incentives
to monitor managers whether they are members o f the board or not, Shleifer and Vishny
(1986). The large shareholders are usually referred to as blockholders (shareholders with
5% or more ownership). Such large shareholders have the incentive to learn more about
the firms’ operations and, either the optimal set o f actions managers should take, or the
state of the world; see section 2.1. They also have more bargaining power than atomistic
shareholders.
Although blockholders have an incentive to actively monitor managers and
facilitate wealth creation, they also have an incentive to take actions that will enrich
themselves at the expense o f other shareholders (wealth distribution). Furst and Kang
(1998) document a positive (negative) relationship between ownership by the largest
non-CEO shareholder and expected operating performance (market value). The limited

10
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wealth blockholders have at their disposal, and the demand for portfolio diversification,
sets the upper limit for the concentration o f ownership. These arguments imply that firms
should once again choose the optimal level o f ownership concentration by equalizing
marginal costs and marginal benefits.
Monitoring by the board of directors is another way firms can mitigate the
agency conflict between managers and shareholders. The board o f directors is at the
center o f the governance system o f corporations. The board is the shareholders’ agent in
negotiations with the CEO and in the monitoring o f the CEO. The board is accountable
to shareholders and, at least in principle, shareholders retain the right to appoint and fire
board members. In practice, however, the CEO, whose activities the board is expected to
monitor, plays a major role in the appointment and termination o f board members. This
casts doubt on the independence of the board and its ability to carry out its duties as
monitor o f the CEO. Board members as agents o f shareholders, like any other selfinterest driven agents, may also have incentives to pursue goals other than shareholder
value maximization. Who will monitor the monitors?
There are, however, contractual and market mechanisms that ensure boards
behave in the interests o f shareholders. Board members’ concern for their reputation as
decision controllers, competition in the market for directors, ownership interest o f board
members, and incentive contracts that tie board members remuneration to firm
performance help ensure that the board acts towards value maximization. Competition in
the product market, the market for corporate control, and investors ability to price

11
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protect themselves also strengthen boards’ motivation to act in the interests o f
shareholders.
In summary, the efficient contracting view contends that there are contractual,
institutional, and market mechanisms that align the interests o f managers with those o f
shareholders. Efficient contracting suggests that firms choose optimal combinations o f
the internal mechanisms by equating margins. These margins depend on firms’
circumstances. That is, firms’ underlying economic characteristics drive the relative costs
and benefits o f the different control mechanisms. The variations we observe in the use o f
the different mechanisms are, therefore, reflections o f differences in firms’ economic
circumstances.
Deviations from the optimal mix will trigger actions from one or more o f the
external (market) mechanisms: labor market, product market or corporate control
market. Therefore, deviations from an optimum cannot persist in the long run. Economic
Darwinism works and only optimal mixes o f the internal mechanisms survive. There is no
unique mix o f pay, ownership or board structure that is suitable to all firms.
In the remainder o f this section, I discuss the implications of efficient contracting
for (1) the relationship among the three internal mechanisms; mix o f pay, ownership and
board structures; (2) the relationship between

compensation and the internal

mechanisms; and (3) the relationship between performance and the internal mechanisms.

12
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2.1.

Mix of pay, board structure and ownership structure
Agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Holmstrom (1979) suggests that

incentive contracts are one way o f mitigating the agency problem between managers and
shareholders. Incentive contracts are generally o f the form w = f ( x ) , where w is the
amount o f incentive based compensation and x is the level o f output measure
(accounting or market) to which it is related. The level o f output depends on the actions
the CEO takes and the state of nature, i.e., x = g(a(-*),s ) . where s is the state o f nature,
and a(s) is the actions taken by the CEO conditional on the state of nature.
There are two conditions under which a firm can use a forcing contract that pays
the CEO a fixed amount when the desired action (or output) is observed and penalizes
him severely for any deviations from it. The first is when managerial actions are
observable and the optimal level of action is known. The second is when there is no
environmental uncertainty, i.e., there is a one to one mapping between a(s) and x, and
the level of optimal action is known. Whenever these two conditions are not present,
firms resort to contracts that relate compensation to an output measure desired by
shareholders such as stock prices, and any other measure o f performance that may be
indicative o f managerial action such as accounting returns.
The extent to which firms use mix o f pay (incentive contracts) to align the
interests of managers with those o f shareholders, therefore, depends on whether
managerial actions are observable, whether the optimal action is known, and the level o f
uncertainty o f the environment in which the firm operates. I refer to these conditions as

13
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monitoring difficulty here after. Other things being equal, firms with high monitoring
difficulty tend to use more mix o f pay (incentive compensation) to mitigate the adverse
effect o f the agency problem. Monitoring difficulty is a characteristic o f the firm’s
investment opportunity set (IOS). Since monitoring difficulty is not observable, I use
IOS variables that drive monitoring difficulty as explanatory variables in the mix o f pay
equation. Measurement o f the IOS variables is discussed in section four.
John and John (1993) and John and Senbet (1998) argue that management
compensation in a levered firm serves not only as a way o f aligning the interests of
managers and shareholders, but also as a precommitment device to minimize the agency
cost of debt. The shareholder/debtholder conflict arises because the shareholders hold
the decision rights, and act to maximize the value o f the equity rather than the value of
the firm. Part o f the manager/shareholder conflict arises because managers have a fixed
claim on the firm through their salary. This fixed claim induces managers to behave like
bondholders; see Smith and Watts (1992). Increasing managers’ mix o f pay moves them
to behave more like shareholders. If, by adjusting the mix o f pay, we can induce
managers to maximize the value o f the firm instead o f the value o f the equity, we can
simultaneously address

the shareholder/manager and

the

shareholder/debtholder

conflicts. As the relative amount debt in the capital structure increases, we want
managers to behave more like debtholders, and mix o f pay must decline.
A secondary effect of debt is that, when covenants exist, debtholders have
incentives to monitor managers’ compliance with those contracts. Further, the incentive
to monitor compliance with covenants increases with leverage. If the covenants increase

14

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

value, such direct monitoring is a substitute for increasing mix o f pay. Both debt
arguments imply that mix o f pay should decline with leverage.
Monitoring difficulty and capital structure are not the only factors that determine
the choice o f mix o f pay, however. Factors that reduce or increase the severity o f the
agency problem between managers and shareholders, and mechanisms that offer
alternative ways o f mitigating the agency problem also affect the choice. A CEO
approaching retirement age is an example o f a condition that exacerbates the agency
problem. As the CEO approaches retirement, the horizon problem becomes more severe
and the threat o f dismissal as a way for disciplining CEOs becomes ineffective. Following
Jensen and Murphy (1990), I include a variable that proxies for a CEO’s approaching
retirement age (CEOOLD) in the mix o f pay equation.
CEO ownership can reduce the severity o f the agency problem between managers
and shareholders. Also, monitoring by large shareholders and the board o f directors help
align the interests o f CEOs with those o f shareholders. Board and ownership variables
are included in the mix o f pay equation because they are alternative ways o f encouraging
CEOs to act in the interests of shareholders.
Therefore, the mix o f pay equation is:
Mix o f pay = f (IOS, leverage, CEOOLD, board, ownership).

2.2.

(2.1)

Compensation, board structure and ownership structure
In a competitive labor market, demand and supply determine the equilibrium level

o f CEO compensation. Firms’ demand for high quality management, i.e., more skilled

15
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and experienced management, other things being equal, will lead to higher expected
CEO compensation. The demand for high quality management is driven by the firm’s
IOS .4 IOS variables (discussed in section four) are, therefore, included in the
compensation equation.
Consistent with the proposals o f agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976),
Holmstrom (1979) and others, I include firm performance measures in the compensation
equation. 1 include both accounting and market measures o f performance that are
discussed in detail in section four.^ Compensation is expected to increase with
performance.
Increasing the mix o f pay shifts risk to the risk averse managers. Risk averse
managers would be willing to bear the additional risk if and only if they are compensated
for it. Therefore, expected compensation will tend to be higher in firms that put more
weight on incentive compensation. This suggests that mix o f pay should be included as
an explanatory variable in the compensation equation.
Individual characteristics o f CEOs, such as educational level and tenure (i.e.,
supply side factors) may also have an effect on compensation. In this paper the focus is
on the moral hazard problem. Following Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999), I assume
that firms in equilibrium will not reward unnecessary human capital investment by CEOs.

4

See Core Holthausen and Larcker (1999), Smith and Watts (1992), and Gaver and Gaver (1993) for
elaborated discussions.

5

See Lambert and Larcker (1987), Paul (1992), Sloan (1993) and others for a detailed discussion on
the role of accounting numbers in compensation contracts.
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Firms are willing to pay only for the skill and experience the job requires as reflected in
the demand side variables mentioned above. Therefore, I do not include individual CEO
characteristics variables in the model.
Efficient contracting suggests that no firm will, in equilibrium, pay CEOs over
and above the compensation level implied by economic determinants. Board and
ownership variables only affect compensation through their effect on the choice o f the
mix of pay. This implies that once one controls for mix o f pay, one should not find any
relation between compensation and the board and ownership variables. However,
opportunism theories predict that board and ownership variables affect compensation,
even after controlling for mix o f pay and other economic determinants. To test this
opportunism hypothesis, the ownership and board structure variables are included in the
compensation equation. The second equation in the structural model is:
Compensation = f (IOS, mix of pay, performance, board, ownership).

2.3.

(2.2)

Performance, board structure and ownership structure
Efficient contracting theories argue that, conditional on their circumstances, firms

choose optimal mixes o f governance mechanisms to align the interests of managers with
those o f shareholders. If deviations from value maximizing choices are public knowledge,
market efficiency implies that movement away from the optimal set o f control
mechanisms affects prices quickly. Therefore, known failures o f control mechanisms
cannot affect future performance. That is, while different ownership and board structures
suit different firms, efficiency implies that there is not a systematic association between
ownership and board structures known today and future performance.
17
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Returns (performance) can be written as the sum o f expected and unexpected
returns, n = E(n) + u;. If the market is semi-strong form efficient, and board structure,
ownership and mix o f pay are known at the beginning o f the year, then neither expected
nor unexpected returns depend on board, ownership or mix variables. The single factor
asset pricing model implies that expected return (performance) depends on systematic
risk (beta). However, recent studies suggest that performance also depends on other
factors. For example, Fama and French (1992) claim that at least two other variables,
size and book to market equity, are important determinants o f performance.
Mehran (1995) and Core et al. (1999) use variables that are correlated with
expected returns to explain performance. They also include board, ownership and mix of
pay in the performance equation to test if these variables affect performance as claimed
by the managerial opportunism theory. The performance equation is
Performance = f (expected return, unexpected return, board, ownership, mix o f pay). (2.3)

2.4.

Summary of structural equations
To summarize, the three equation structural model is

Mix o f pay = f (IOS, leverage, CEOOLD, board, ownership),

(2.1)

Compensation = f (IOS, mix of pay, performance, board, ownership),

(2.2)

Performance = f (expected return, unexpected return, board, ownership, mix o f pay). (2.3)
The optimal mix o f pay a firm chooses depends on the IOS, leverage, whether the
CEO is close to retirement, and the firm’s choice o f ownership and board structures.
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There is a relationship (substitution or complementarity) among the internal governance
mechanisms. That is, board structure and ownership affect mix o f pay.
The IOS affects compensation because large firms, growth firms, and risky firms
require managers with different skills from firms without these characteristics. Mix o f
pay affects CEO compensation because the mix o f pay chosen influences the magnitude
of the compensation risk imposed on the CEO. Under efficient contracting, board and
ownership structures affect compensation only through their effect on mix o f pay. Given
that each firm chooses an optimal mix o f the internal mechanisms, a cross sectional
regression o f compensation on board structure and ownership that controls for mix o f
pay should not find any systematic relationship between compensation and these
mechanisms.
Asset pricing and informational efficiency arguments imply that known board
structure, ownership and mix o f pay do not affect future performance. The next section
summarizes prior empirical studies, and evaluates them in light o f this section. Some
studies appear in more than one category. Essentially all prior studies mix efficiency and
opportunism arguments.
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3.

Summary and Evaluation o f Prior Empirical Literature
Many empirical studies investigate the effectiveness o f the various mechanisms

firms use to resolve the agency problem between managers and shareholders. Early
studies focus on examining the relationship between executive pay and firm performance,
firm performance and management turnover, firm performance and corporate control.
These studies are predicated on the assumption that governance failures lead to high
levels o f compensation not related to firm performance, and to low rates o f management
turnover following poor firm performance. Recent studies investigate the relationships o f
mix of pay, compensation and firm performance with board structure and ownership. A
brief summary follows.

3.1.

Compensation and performance correlation studies
Early compensation-performance studies compare the correlation between

executive compensation (salary, salary and bonus or total compensation) and
performance (market or accounting based) with the correlation between executive
compensation and some measure o f firm size (such as sales, size o f the labor force,
etc.).^ These early studies find that the correlation between compensation and
performance is not as high and/or as significant as the correlation o f compensation to
some measure o f size. For example, see Gordon (1962), Marris (1964), Williamson
(1963), Baumol (1967), and Galbraith (1967). The results were interpreted as being

See Holmstrom (1979), Gejsdal (1981), Paul (1992), and Sloan (1993) for detailed discussion on the
role of accounting numbers.

20

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

supportive o f the claim that managers pursue goals other than shareholder value
maximization.
There are two reasons for care in the interpretation o f these findings. First, the
size variables used in these studies may be proxying for the difficulty o f managing larger
firms and the demand for higher quality managers by larger firms. If so, the positive
association between size and compensation is consistent with efficient contracting
instead o f management entrenchment. Second, the results may be biased because o f
correlated omitted variables that are discussed in the next subsection.

3.2.

Compensation and performance regression studies
Later studies address potential correlated omitted variables problem in early pay

performance studies by including other economic determinants o f pay as regressors.
These include growth opportunities, risk, characteristics o f the individual managers (e.g.,
age, tenure), size and performance measure(s) in a multi-variable single equation model.
Contrary to the correlation type studies, these studies document a statistically significant
association between pay and performance.^ For example, see Lewellen and Huntsman
(1970), Murphy (1985), Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Jensen and Murphy (1990),
Main (1991), Sloan (1993), Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and Gaver (1993), Kaplan
(1994), and Baber, Janakiraman and Kang (1996).

7

There is some concern that the pay performance relation coefficient, though statistically significant,
is not economically significant. Benston (1985) argues that though the performance sensitivity
appears low relative to the wealth of shareholders, it is significant relative to the wealth of
managers. It is the latter that matters for aligning the interest of managers with that of shareholders.
Tevlin (1996), and Hadlock and Lumer (1997) suggest that model misspecification and research
design problems may account for the low pay performance sensitivity reported in the literature.
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3.3.

Compensation, performance, ownership structure and board structure
As discussed in section two, efficient contracting suggests that each firm chooses

an optimal mix o f the different internal mechanisms, mix o f pay, ownership and board
structures, conditional on the characteristics o f its underlying assets (IOS) and the
relative costs and benefits o f the alternative mechanisms. Any known deviations from the
optimal choice will be quickly reflected in price and hence cannot affect future
performance. Competition in the labor market for managers and the market for corporate
control also ensure that no firm systematically overcompensates its CEO, irrespective o f
the ownership and board structures it chooses.
Empirical researchers investigate the effect o f ownership by CEOs, other officers
and directors, and blockholders on compensation and performance. Their aim is to test
the efficient contracting predictions that compensation and performance should be
unrelated to ownership and board structures in a cross sectional regression.
The ownership variables used by most empirical research are: the ownership
interests o f the CEO, other officers and directors (collectively known as insiders),
ownership o f large external shareholders (blockholders, including or not including
institutional owners). Different studies use different proxies to capture these constructs
as we see below. M ost studies use the composition o f the board (percentage outsider (or
insider)), the CEO being chair o f the board, and board size to characterize the
effectiveness o f the board. Recent studies have further subdivided outside directors into
multitudes o f subgroups on the basis o f conjectures that are not driven by theory.
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3.3.1. Compensation, ownership structure and board structure
Some studies explore the relationship between ownership structure and executive
compensation. They test the effect o f ownership by the CEO and blockholders on the
level o f executive compensation. Allen (1981), Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt (1993) and
Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) find a significant negative association between
CEO compensation and CEO ownership while Cyert, Kang, Kumar and Shah (1997) find
a significant positive association between compensation and CEO ownership. Cyert,
Kang, Kumar and Shah (1997) also find that there is a negative relationship between
CEO compensation and ownership o f the largest shareholder (CEO or non-CEO).
Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt (1993) and Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999)
find a negative relation between CEO compensation and the presence o f an outside
blockholder (and/or a non-CEO inside board member who owns 5% or more o f the
shares). As opposed to Core et al. (1999), Cyert et al. (1997) find (a) no association
between CEO compensation and the presence o f an insider with 5% or more ownership;
and (b) a significant positive relationship between CEO compensation and the presence
of an external blockholder. Core et al. (1999) report no statistically significant relation
between CEO compensation and percentage ownership per outside director.
Other studies examine the relationship between executive compensation and
board structure. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1988) find no association between executive
compensation and the percentage o f outside director on the board. Lambert, Larcker,
and Weigelt (1993), Cyert, Kang, Kumar, and Shah (1997), and Core, Holthausen and
Larcker (1999) report a positive association between executive compensation and the
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percentage of outside directors on the board. Core et al. (1999) also find a significant
positive association between CEO compensation and the proportion o f “grey” directors
on the board.*
Cyert et al. (1997) and Core et al. (1999) interpret their findings as supportive o f
the view that outside directors are hand-picked by the CEO. They argue that outsiders
are less likely to take a position antagonistic to the CEO, especially when it comes to
CEO compensation. It is not, however, clear how, or why, inside directors working
under the CEO could be more independent than outside directors, since the same CEOs
who hand-pick outside directors are likely to hand-pick the inside directors too.
Researchers often use separation o f the posts o f CEO and chairperson o f the
board (CHAIR) as another proxy for the monitoring effectiveness of the board o f
directors. Some, for example, Cyert et al. (1997), and Core et al. (1999) conclude that
agency problems are higher when the CEO also chairs the board because the CEO will
have more bargaining power with the board. However, higher compensation to a CEO
who also chairs the board is consistent with increased responsibility. The CEO is the
most informed person about the firm and hence a natural candidate for the position o f
chairperson o f the board. Having the CEO chair the board enhances the effectiveness o f
the board by reducing conflicts. Given economic Darwinism, and that about 90% o f my
sample o f S&P 500 firms combine the two positions, supports this latter view.

A director is considered grey if he or his employer received payments from the company in excess of
his board pay.
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Unlike empirical researchers that treat outside board members as a homogenous
group, Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt (1993), and Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999)
divide outside directors into those appointed to the board before and after the CEO took
office. Outside directors that joined the board after the CEO took office are assumed to
be appointed by the CEO and hence less independent. These researchers find a positive
association between CEO compensation and the percentage o f outside directors
appointed to the board after the CEO took office. Hallock (1997) subdivides outside
directors into interlocked (those in whose firms the CEO or any other officer of the firm
serves as director) and non interlocked, and finds that firms with a higher proportion o f
interlocked outside directors pay higher compensation to their CEOs. Core et al. (1999)
find a positive, but insignificant, relation between CEO compensation and the proportion
of interlocked outside directors.
Defining outsiders who join the board after the CEO came into office as being
appointed by the CEO is arbitrary. The shareholders (or at least the blockholders) may
have exercised their rights in the appointment o f these directors. Even board members
appointed to the board by the CEO may not necessarily allow the CEO to entrench
himself, as long as other mechanisms such as tying board members pay to firm
performance, board members’ concern for their reputation, and the corporate control
market are effective. Moreover, the proportion o f outside directors appointed after the
CEO came to office is likely to be highly correlated with CEO tenure. In a compensation
equation that does not include CEO tenure as an explanatory variable, the proportions o f
outside directors appointed after the CEO came into office may proxy for the effect o f
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CEO tenure on compensation. ^ Finally, though it is reasonable to argue that some
outside board members (for example those hand picked by CEO, interlocked directors,
etc.) are less independent than other outside directors, it is hard to explain why these
outside board members are less independent than inside board m em b ers.^
Other empirical studies examine the effect o f board size on executive
compensation. Larger boards may be better than small boards if they allow the firm to
avail itself o f the services o f different experts. 11 Larger boards also have more people to
monitor the CEO. In contrast, Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) argue that large
boards are less effective than small boards due to the free rider problem, coordination
problems, and large board’s higher susceptibility to manipulations by the CEO.
Yermack (1996) reports a strongly negative coefficient on an interaction term
(abnormal return times board size) when it is included in a model for studying the payperformance sensitivity o f CEO compensation. He interprets this evidence as supporting
the conjecture that small boards give stronger compensation incentives to CEOs. Core,
Holthausen and Larcker (1999) find a positive relation between executive compensation
and board size, which they claim is consistent with ineffectiveness o f large boards. Cyert,
Kang, Kumar and Shah (1997) find no association between compensation and board size

9

For example Cyert et al. (1997) find a positive association between CEO tenure and salary and
bonus in their small firms sub sample.
10 Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) explain the positive coefficient on percentage of outside board
members in the compensation regression by lack of independence of the board. They did not,
however, explain why internal board members can be more independent.
11 It is unclear why the expert needs to be on die board; firms hire many experts who are not appointed
to the board.
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using log (board size) as a scaled measure of board size. Cyert et al. (1997) suggest that
correlation between sales as a measure o f size and board size or log (board size) may
have driven the Core et al. (1999) findings.

3.3.2. Performance, ownership structure and board structure
Using a sample o f 371 Fortune 500 firms, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)
investigate the relationship between Tobin’s Q (as a measure o f firm performance) and
ownership by the board o f directors (insiders as well as outsiders) and control variables.
The control variables used as proxies for investment opportunities are R&D, advertising
and long term debt, each scaled by the replacement cost o f assets. The replacement cost
of assets is also used as a proxy for size. They find that: (a) Tobin’s Q increases with
increases in board ownership at low (0 to 5%) and high (greater than 25%) levels o f
ownership; and (b) Tobin’s Q declines with increases in board ownership at intermediate
(5% to 25%) levels o f ownership. Ownership by both inside and outside directors is used
in lieu o f board ownership to test if the impact o f the board’s ownership stake on market
valuation is dependent on who owns that stake. They find that Tobin’s Q is related to
both components o f board ownership in the same way that it is related to overall board
ownership.
Using a sample o f 1173 firms for 1976 and 1093 firms for 1986 McConnell and
Servaes (1990) examine the relationship between Tobin’s Q and ownership by corporate
insiders (officers and members o f the board o f directors), blockholders, and institutional
investors and control variables. They use similar control variables to Morck et al. (1988),
and find a strong curvilinear relationship (strongly positive at lower levels and weakly
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negative at higher levels) between Tobin’s Q and insider ownership. They also find a
strong positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and institutional ownership. No
significant relationship is found between Tobin’s Q and alternative specifications o f
blockholder ownership. ^
O f the different ways o f mitigating the agency problem between managers and
shareholders, the Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell et al. (1990) studies include only
ownership variables in the performance equation. There are, however, some other
complementary or substitute mechanisms (such as incentive-based compensation,
monitoring by the board) that may help align the interests o f managers with those o f
shareholders. To the extent that the excluded variables are correlated with the variables
included in the model, the results may be biased. Later studies by Hermalin and Weisbach
(1991) and Mehran (1995) address this concern by including board characteristic
variables in the performance equation.
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) report a positive (negative) association between
firm performance and ownership by current and former CEOs still on the board at low
(high) levels o f ownership. 13 They include board composition (the percentage of
outsiders on the board), median ownership by inside and outside board members, an
indicator variable if any two directors are related, CEO tenure, growth opportunities and

12 McConnell and Servaes (1990) used three alternative measures of blockholder ownership:
ownership by the largest outside blockholder as reported by Value line; sum of the ownership of all
large outside blockholders as reported by Value line; and an indicator variable equal to 1 if a
blockholder (a 5 % or more owner) exist, 0 otherwise.
13 Low level of ownership means less than 1% ownership in this study.
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firm size proxies as additional explanatory variables in the model. Yermack (1996)
documents a positive association between firm performance and ownership by officers
and directors. Mehran (199S) finds a positive association between firm performance and
managerial ownership (alternatively defined as CEO ownership, ownership by the top
five executives and ownership by all officers and directors) after controlling for growth,
risk, size, leverage, percentage of equity-based compensation and board composition. ^
In a model that endogenizes ownership, Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1998) find no
relationship between firm performance and CEO ownership.
Other studies investigate the relationship between firm performance and board
structure. Using board composition (percentage o f outside directors on the board) as a
proxy for the independence of the board from the CEO and association studies
methodology, Baysinger and Butler (1985), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Mehran
(1995), Yermack (1996), and Bhagat and Black (1997), find no relationship between
firm performance and the percentage o f outsiders on the board. Agrawal and Knoeber
(1996) document a significant negative association between firm performance and the
percentage of outside directors on the board in a study that explores the use o f seven
different mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders in
a simultaneous equations framework. Core et al. (1999) also report a negative
association between future firm performance and percentage o f outside directors on the
board.

14 The ownership variables used by Mehran (1995) include both shares and stock options owned by the
CEO, the top five executive officers and all officers and directors.
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In an informationally efficient market, if increasing the number (or percentage) o f
outside directors is expected to lead to better performance, the effect should be reflected
in price at the time o f the appointment o f the outside directors. If the effect is reflected in
price at the time o f the event, it is not surprising that most o f the association studies find
no relationship between subsequent performance and proxies for board independence.
Rosenstein and Wyatt ( 1 9 9 0 ) find a positive stock price reaction to the appointment o f
outside directors. Examining the relationship between CEO turnover and firm
performance, Weisbach

(1 9 8 8 )

reports that there is a stronger negative relationship

between management turnover and performance in firms that have boards dominated by
outsiders.
Rosenstein and Wyatt

(1 9 9 0 )

and Weisbach

(1 9 8 8 )

interpret their findings as

consistent with the conjectures that: (a) Inside board members (board members who are
current and former officers/employees of the firm), whose continued employment and
careers are closely linked to the CEO, are less independent than outside board members;
and (b) Board independence is valued by the market.
Yermack

(1996)

finds a significant

negative

association

between

firm

performance and board size. Core et al. (1999) also report a negative association
between future firm performance and what they call predicted excess compensation.
Board size and CHAIR are two o f the variables that they include in the determination o f
excess compensation. This suggests that larger boards and CHAIR lead to poor future
performance.
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3.4.

Mix of pay, compensation and performance

Boards o f directors negotiate compensation contracts with CEOs. Compensation has
two primary components: A fixed component, salary, and a variable component that
changes with the level of firm performance (accounting or market based). The variable
component is sensitive to firm performance and is generally meant to motivate managers
to act in the interests o f shareholders.
Empirical researchers examine the relation between mix o f pay and the IOS, mix
o f pay and the alternative mechanisms firms use to resolve the agency conflict with
managers, compensation and mix of pay and performance and mix o f pay. Each o f these
is discussed in turn.
The weight firms put on the variable component of compensation, mix o f pay,
depends on the underlying characteristics o f the firm and the relative costs and benefits
of other mechanisms (complements and/or substitutes) firms use to resolve the agency
problem between managers and shareholders. Smith and Watts (1992), and Gaver and
Gaver (1993) examine the relation between IOS variables and firm financial, dividend
and compensation policies. They document that growth firms and large firms tend to use
stock based and bonus based compensation more, while regulated firms tend to use them
less. In a study that uses percentage o f equity based compensation as dependent variable,
Mehran (199S) reports a positive relationship between the percentage o f equity based
compensation and research intensity. Unlike Smith and Watts (1992), Mehran (1995)
does not find any size effect. The leverage and risk variables are also found to have no
effect in M ehran’s (1995) study.
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Examining the relations among the alternative incentive alignment mechanisms
firms use, Mehran (1995) reports that firms with more outsiders on the board tend to put
more weight on equity based compensation. He also documents a negative association
between the percentage o f equity-based compensation and the percentage o f shares held
by inside or outside blockholders. Core et al. (1999) find a positive relation between the
percentage o f non-salary compensation and board size, percentage o f gray directors,
percentage o f outside directors over age 69, percentage stock ownership per outside
director. Core et al. (1999) also find a negative association between the percentage o f
non-salary compensation and the percentage o f inside directors, CEO percentage
ownership, the existence o f an inside or outside blockholder. I 5
The evidence on the relation between mix o f pay and IOS is consistent with
predictions of efficient contracting. Though, most o f prior research give opportunistic
explanation to the relation between mix o f pay and alternative mechanisms to resolve the
agency conflict with managers, the evidence is also consistent with efficient contracting;
alternative mechanisms are substitutes or complements to mix o f pay.
Core et al. (1999) find a positive association between total compensation and mix
o f pay which they argue is indicative o f a governance failure; weak governance leading
to high mix and high compensation. Smith and Watts (1992) document a strong positive

15 Kole (1995) examines the terms of ex ante compensation contracts (stock options, restricted stocks,
etc.) and the characteristics of assets being managed. She finds evidence consistent with the
hypothesis that underlying firm characteristics play crucial roles in the determination of the terms
of compensation contracts. Ittner, Larcker and Rajan (1997) investigate the factors that influence
the relative weights placed on financial and non-financial performance measures in CEO bonus
contracts.
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correlation between the level o f compensation and the use by firms o f stock (and bonus)
based compensation.
Efficient contracting recognizes that increasing mix o f pay entails some cost. The
variable component that is tied to firm performance shifts risk from well-diversified
shareholders (usually characterized as risk neutral) to relatively less diversified managers
(usually characterized as risk averse). This results in inefficient risk sharing relative to
first best contracts that would impose all the risk on the well diversified shareholders.
Firms have to pay a risk premium and hence higher expected compensation to the risk
averse managers. Therefore, expected total compensation is higher when a firm puts
more weight on the variable component o f compensation.
Mehran (1995) investigates the relationship between two measures o f firm
performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA) and the percentage o f equity-based compensation
(the sum of grant value o f new stock options, phantom stock, restricted stock, and
performance shares expressed as a percentage o f total compensation. He finds a
significant positive relationship between both performance measures and the percentage
o f equity-based compensation. Brickley, Bhagat and Lease (1985) find a positive
abnormal return upon firms’ adopting stock-based compensation. These results are
considered supportive o f the claim that mix o f pay helps align the interests o f mangers
with those o f shareholders.
However, it is not evident that there should be a positive relationship between
performance and mix o f pay in a cross sectional regression as long as one includes the
different mechanisms firms use to resolve the agency conflict with managers. Efficient
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contracting suggests that different combinations o f mechanisms are optimal for different
firms.

3.5.

Other related studies
Other studies examine the relationship between management turnover and firm

performance (accounting or market based). These studies reason that, if the existing
corporate governance mechanisms are effective in disciplining managers for actions or
results that hurt shareholders, poor performance should be a predictor o f management
turnover. Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Benston (1985), Warner, Watts and Wruck
(1988) and Kaplan (1994) document that management turnover is negatively related to
performance.
Shivdasani (1993) documents a negative association between the likelihood that a
firm becomes a takeover target and board ownership. If reduced probability o f being a
target stems from better performance, then increased ownership by board members helps
strengthen the governance system of corporations. Shivdasani (1993) also explores
whether a firm being a takeover target affects the reputations o f directors, as reflected in
the number o f additional directorships they hold. He documents that outside directors o f
targets in hostile takeovers hold fewer additional directorships. He interpret this as
consistent with the assertion by Fama and Jensen (1983) that a board’s concern for
reputation motivates it to closely monitor the CEO, and take actions consistent with the
interests of shareholders.
Yermack (1996) examines the effect o f board size on management turnover
following poor firm performance. In a Logit regression model that relates management
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turnover to cumulative abnormal return, an interaction term o f abnormal return and
board size, and other control variables, he finds a strongly positive coefficient on the
interaction term which is consistent with the assertion that small boards are more
effective in monitoring CEOs than are large boards.
Finally, Klein (1998) examines the relation between firm performance and the
committee structure o f boards and the directors’ roles within these committees. He finds
that: (a) There is a positive relation between performance (accounting and/or market
based) and the percentage of inside directors on finance and investment committees; (b)
Firms that increase the representation o f inside directors on the finance and investment
committees earn a significantly higher contemporaneous stock return and return on
investment than firms that decrease the representation o f inside directors in these
committees. The results are interpreted to be consistent with the claim by Fama and
Jensen (1983) that inside board members are better decision managers than outside
board members.

3.6.

Evaluation of compensation and performance studies
Taken together, the pay-performance and turnover performance studies imply

that the different market, institutional and contractual mechanisms are effective in
aligning the interests o f managers with those o f shareholders.
A positive association between CEO compensation and firm performance
suggests that CEOs are rewarded for creating wealth to shareholders. This evidence is
inconsistent with the claims by managerial opportunism theory that CEOs enrich
themselves at the expense o f shareholders. Higher compensation should not be construed
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as an indicator o f a governance failure as long as it leads to higher wealth for
shareholders. The goal is not to minimize compensation, but to maximize the wealth o f
shareholders.
A negative association between management turnover and firm performance
suggests that firms fire poorly performing CEOs. This contradicts managerial
opportunism

stories

about

CEO entrenchment,

captive boards and powerless

shareholders. This association is consistent with efficient contracting predictions that
firms use optimal combinations o f governance mechanisms to mitigate agency problems
between managers and shareholders.
It is important to note that the evidence provided in the foregoing studies is on
the overall effectiveness o f all contractual, institutional and market mechanisms without
specific reference to one or other of the mechanisms. Recent studies question the
optimality (effectiveness) o f some of the contractual, institutional and monitoring
mechanisms that firms use in resolving the agency problem between managers and
shareholders. These studies examine the relations among mix o f pay, compensation, firm
performance, ownership and board structure.
Table 1 provides a summary of the foregoing analyses that abstracts from the
particulars o f variable measurement; the emphasis is on concepts. There are three
sources o f difficulty in table 1. Some results are inconsistent across studies. Others
violate market efficiency, and some require an optimal governance structure that is the
same for all firms. I discuss these in turn.
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First, some studies find different signs on the same variable. One example is
different signs (negative, 0, positive) for the percentage o f outsiders on the board in the
performance equation. Authors who find a negative sign interpret this as evidence that
increasing the proportion o f outsiders on the board reflects poor governance leading to
managerial entrenchment and poor performance. Authors who find a positive sign
interpret this as evidence that increasing the proportion o f outsiders on the board reflects
good governance imposing discipline on CEOs, and improved performance.
Studies that find the same sign on a variable at times differ in interpretation. For
example, the positive relationship between mix o f pay and percentage o f outsiders on the
board is interpreted as a sign of bad governance (managerial opportunism) by some and a
result o f efficient contracting (substitution among governance mechanisms) by others. A
board and ownership structure may be considered effective (good governance) by
performance studies and ineffective (bad governance) by compensation studies. For
example, compensation studies that find a positive sign on percentage o f outside
directors interpret their finding as evidence o f governance failure, while performance
studies that find a positive sign on the same variable interpret their finding as suggestive
of good governance. Higher percentage o f outsiders in the board is good and bad at the
same time: CEOs are selectively opportunistic.
Second, claims that certain ownership and board structures systematically lead to
overcompensation and poor stock performance are inconsistent with market efficiency.
In an informationally efficient market, differences in observable firm characteristics such
as the structure o f ownership cannot lead to differences in firm performance, as any
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Table 1: Characterization and Interpretation of Prior Empirical Literature
Variables
Ownership Structure
CEO ownership
Inside ownership
Outside blockholders
Board Structure
Percentage of outsiders
CEO chairs board
Board size
Mix of Pay

Mix of Pay

Compensation

Performance

Management
Turnover

-

-»+

o,+

-

+

+
0,+

+

o,+
+

-,o

0,+
o, +
0,+
+

0,+

-

+

-

+

Interpretation: Mix of pay equation. Some prior studies interpret positive coefficients
on ownership and board variables as evidence o f governance failure, and hence
opportunism. Others interpret positive coefficients as evidence o f efficient contracting;
there is substitution among internal governance mechanisms.
Interpretation: Compensation equation. Positive coefficients on ownership and board
variables are interpreted as evidence o f a governance failure leading to excess
compensation. Some interpret the positive sign on mix o f pay as an indicator o f
opportunism while others offer an efficient contracting explanation; more performance
related pay requires a higher risk premium.
Interpretation: Performance equation. Positive coefficients on ownership, board and
mix o f pay variables are interpreted as evidence o f good governance.
Interpretation: Management turnover after poor performance. Positive coefficients
on ownership and board variables are interpreted as evidence o f good governance; firms
that have good governance are likely to fire CEOs that perform poorly.

effects these differences have on future performance should be reflected in today’s price.
Further, competition in the internal and external labor market for managers and the
presence o f active corporate control markets ensures that CEOs are not persistently
overcompensated.
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Third, implicit in many interpretations is the assumption that there is a unique
optimal ownership and board structure for all firms. Yet, in practice, firms use different
mixes o f the internal control mechanisms and have done so since the inception o f modem
corporations. It is hard to justify the persistence o f inefficient governance mechanisms
over long time periods and across many firms in otherwise competitive and efficient
markets.
A “good” theory would reconcile the mixed findings and be consistent with
market efficiency. Typically, prior compensation and performance studies ignore mix o f
pay and those that include mix o f pay do not take its endogeneity into account. There is
a correlated omitted variable and endogeneity problem. I address both these problems by
investigating simultaneously the different substitute and complementary mechanisms
firms use to resolve the agency problem between managers and shareholders. These
mechanisms include incentive contracts, monitoring by blockholders, and monitoring by
the board. The next section extends the theory o f section two to measurement o f
variables and provides descriptive statistics.
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4.

Sample Selection, Measurement and Descriptive Statistics
This section describes the sample selection procedure, discusses variables and

their measurement, presents the empirical model and the testable hypotheses, and
provides descriptive statistics on selected variables. One objective o f this study is to
reconcile and integrate prior studies in the area, so measuring variables in similar ways to
prior studies is essential; the following definitions reflect this. However, some variables
from prior studies are not used because they are ad hoc in nature and it is not clear what
they are capturing.

4.1.

Data and sample selection
The data sources for the variables used in the paper are: ExecuComp for

compensation and CEO ownership; Compact Disclosure for the board and ownership
characteristic variables; and CRSP and COMPUSTAT for the financial variables.
The sample for this study is the S&P 500 firms that have CEO compensation
information on the Standard & Poors’ ExecuComp data base for the year 1993. Lagged
values are required for some variables. The year 1993 is used because it is the first year
after SEC electronic filing of proxy statements and disaggregation o f compensation
became requirements that provides access to lagged variables.
Table 2A summarizes the information on the sample selection procedure. There
are 462 firms with compensation data on ExecuComp. I exclude 185 firms, financial
firms and firms that have a non 12/31 fiscal year ends. O f the remaining 277 firms, 35
lack board and ownership data on Compact Disclosure. Another 47 firms are lost due to
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missing values in the CRSP and Compustat data bases. The final sample consists o f 19S
firms.
Table 2B reports the industry breakdown in the sample and comparative numbers
from the 1993 population of Compustat firms. The population comparisons exclude the
same groups as the sample, finance, insurance, real estate (6000-6999) and government
(9000-9999). The sample over-represents manufacturing and utility firms and under
represents service firms relative to the population. However, this is characteristic o f the
S&P 500.

4.2.

Variables and measurement
This section discusses measurement issues. The endogenous and predetermined

variables are discussed separately.

4.2.1. Endogenous variables
Mix o f pay captures the component o f incentive compensation in total
compensation.

It is measured as percentage o f performance related

incentive

compensation (bonus, stock options, restricted stock, long term incentive pay, and other
compensation) in total compensation, as in Core et al. (1999)
Mix of pay = [(Total compensation - Salary)/Total compensation] for the year 1993.
Ideally, one would use an ex ante measure o f mix o f pay. However, the ex ante
measure o f mix o f pay cannot be determined on the basis o f any data. Contracts are
deliberately vague to allow compensation committees discretion to account for all
circumstances.
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Table 2A: Sample Selection Procedure
Initial Sample: S&P 500 firms on the ExecuComp database
Less: Financial firms (SIC 6000 to 6999) and firms that do not
have a 12/31 fiscal period

462
(185)
277
(35)

Less: Firms with Missing ownership and board o f directors
variables on Compact Disclosure
Less: Firms with missing data on COMPUSTAT and CRSP tapes

242
(47)

Sample used in the study

195

Table 2B: Industry Composition
SIC Codes

0001-0999
1000-1499
1500-1799
2000-3999
4000-4999
5000-5999
7000-8999

Industry

Agriculture, forestry, fishing
Extraction
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation & utilities
Wholesale and retail trade
Services

Number
of
Sample
Firms

Cumulative
Sample
Percentage

11
1

5.6

129
34
10
10

Cum ulative
Population
Percentage*
0.7
8.9

6.2

10.6

72.3
89.7
94.9

60.5
70.0
84.1

100.0

100.0

* Population o f 1993 Compustat firms excluding finance, insurance, real estate
(6000-6999) and government (9000-9999).

Even if firms base their choice o f mix on some targeted level o f performance, the
target is not observable. As in prior studies, the mix o f pay measure used is an ex post
measure. Therefore, it has a mechanical relationship with concurrent performance that
might lead to a spurious correlation between the two variables. This issue is not
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addressed by prior studies. In this paper the problem o f spurious correlation is
significantly mitigated, since mix o f pay is endogenously determined within the system.
Compensation is total compensation. It includes salary, bonus, stock options,
restricted stock, long term incentive pay, and other compensation for 1993. These
variables are reported in the ExecuComp data base. Salary is the fixed portion o f
compensation, which is known at the beginning o f the period. Bonus is often related to
accounting performance and is the amount granted during the year. Stock options and
restricted stock values are the Black/Scholes values at the time o f the grant. Long term
incentive pay is measured by the payout during the year.
Performance is measured using market return. It is the continuously compounded
annual return for 1993.

4.2.2. Predetermined variables
Like most prior studies, size (SIZE), growth options (GROWTH) and volatility
of returns (VOL) are the investment opportunity set (IOS) variables used in this study. ^
Size is measured using sales. Growth options are measured by market value o f equity
plus book value of debt divided by book value o f assets. Volatility is measured by
standard deviation o f monthly returns over the 60 months prior to 1993.
Leverage, ROA, market beta, CEOOLD and a regulation dummy are also used.
Leverage (LR) is measured by the ratio o f long term debt to total assets. ROA is an

16 Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and Gaver (1993), Mehran (1995) used size, growth and risk
variables in their mix of pay equations.
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accounting performance measure and equals earnings before interest and taxes divided
by total assets.
Market beta is the single factor CAPM beta calculated using 60 monthly returns
prior to 1993. The variable used in this study (BETA) is market beta multiplied by the
market return for 1993. If market beta instead o f the product term is used, there is
uncertainty about the sign of the coefficient. A negative coefficient could result from a
negative market return and a positive coefficient or a positive market return and a
negative coefficient. Since market return for 1993 is a cross sectional constant, using the
product instead o f market beta only changes the coefficient estimate and standard error
for this particular variable. The t-statistic and the p-value will not change.
When a CEO approaches retirement, he faces an horizon problem. CEOOLD
captures this effect. It is an indicator variable that is unity when the CEO is 64 years or
older. The regulation dummy (REG) is unity when a firm is a utility (i.e., two digit
SIC=49).
The ownership and board variables I use are those commonly used by most prior
studies and directly relate to the theory in section two. Using variables that cut across
many studies is essential, since the objective o f this study is to reconcile and integrate
prior studies in the area.
Some variables used in prior studies are ignored because they are ad hoc in nature
and it is not clear what they capture. For example, consider the variable ‘busy’ outside
directors used by Core et al. (1999). An outside director is considered busy if he is a
member o f 3 (6 if retired) or more other boards. If the idea is to capture the amount o f
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time the board member can spend on his board duties, one must consider all factors that
demand the time o f the board member. It could be that those who are members o f less
than 3 boards are the busiest and that is why they are members o f few boards.
CEO ownership and the existence o f internal and external blockholders are the
ownership variables used. ^ These variables reflect the incentive alignment effect that
the ownership interests o f the major players (CEO, non-CEO insiders and blockholders)
may have. They also capture the relative bargaining power o f each participant, and hence
the relative influence o f each person on decisions made within the firm.
CEO ownership (CEOOWN) is measured by the percentage o f ownership o f the
CEO. INSOWN is an indicator variable that equals one when a non-CEO insider owns
5% or more o f the outstanding shares. OUTBLOCK is an indicator variable that equals
one when an outsider (including institutions) owns 5% or more o f the outstanding
shares.
CHAIR, board size (BDSIZE), and percentage o f inside directors (BDINSIDE)
are the board structure variables. Chair is set to unity when the CEO also chairs the
board. BDSIZE is measured by the number o f directors on the board. BDINSIDE is
defined as the percentage o f inside directors on the board.

Using the aggregate officer and director statistics is recommended by Anderson and Lee (1997) in
an article entitled Field Guide for Research Using Ownership data.
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4.3.

Empirical model
Combining the theoretical model in section two with measurement o f the

variables provides the following empirical model, which is used to test the hypotheses in
the paper.
MIX = P, o + P ij SIZE + p, ..GROWTH + Pu VOL + p, 4LR + p, jCEOOLD +
P, 6CHAIR + p, 7BDSIZE + p, gBDINSIDE + p, 9CEOOWN + p U0INSOWN +

(4.1)

p, n OUTBLOCK + e,
COMP = p20 + p2 ,SIZE + p2 .GROWTH + P2.3VOL + P24LR + p 25ROA92 +
p 26CHAIR + p27 BDSIZE + p2gBDINSIDE + P29CEOOWN + p 210INSOWN +

(4.2)

p2 ,,OUTBLOCK + <j>2 ,MIX + <j)23PERF + e 2
PERF = p30 + P3.,SIZE + P32GROWTH + p3JVOL + P34BETA +
p 36CHAIR + p 37BDSIZE + p3gBDINSIDE + p 39CEOOWN + p 3,0INSOWN +

(4.3)

P3, ,OUTBLOCK + <f>3, MIX + e 3

Where:
MIX

= Percentage o f incentive compensation in total CEO compensation.
That

is,

(total compensation

minus

salary) divided by total

compensation.
COMP

= Total CEO Compensation. It includes salary and bonus, stock
options,

performance

units,

performance

shares

and

stock

appreciation rights.
PERF

= M arket return for 1993 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly
returns).
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SIZE

Sales for the year 1992.

GROWTH

Growth options for 1992 defined as (Market value o f equity + book
value o f debt)/book value o f assets.

VOL

Standard deviation (in percentages) o f monthly returns (measure o f
firm risk).

LR

Leverage measure defined as (long term debt/total assets) for 1992.

ROA

ROA for the year 1993 (in percentages)

ROA92

ROA for the year 1992 (in percentages)

PERF92

Market return for 1992 (continuously compounded from 12 monthly
returns).

BETA

(Market beta from a one factor CAPM model calculated using 60
monthly returns prior to 1993) multiplied by market return for 1993.

CEOOLD

An indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 64 years or older.

REG

An indicator variable that equals I when the firm isa regulated utility.

CHAIR

An indicator variable which equals 1 when the CEO is also the
chairman o f the board and 0, otherwise.

BDSIZE

Number o f directors.

BDINSIDE

Percentage o f inside directors on the board.

CEOOWN

Percentage ownership o f CEO.
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INSOWN

=

An indicator variable set to 1, when there is a non-CEO insider with
ownership o f 5% or more or 0, otherwise.

OUTBLOCK =

An indicator variable set to 1, when there is an outsider (including
Institutional owners) with ownership o f 5% or more or 0, otherwise.

4.4.

Sign predictions
Predictions reflect the efficiency theory in section two extended to measured

variables. Some additional analysis is provided for the mix o f pay equation, but detailed
predictions for compensation and performance follow directly from section two. Only
discussion not already in section two is included here.

4.4.1. Mix of pay equation (4.1)
Monitoring difficulty increases with firm size, growth and volatility, so mix of
pay increases with these variables. However, increased volatility requires compensation
for bearing that risk and leads to increased salary, thereby decreasing mix o f pay. With
opposing positive and negative effects o f volatility on mix, the net effect o f volatility on
mix is an empirical matter.
As the CEO approaches retirement, the horizon problem increases and dismissal
as a motivating device is ineffective. This suggests increasing incentive compensation
(particularly, long term incentive pay) as retirement approaches. CEOOLD is predicted
to have a positive effect on mix.
Appointing the CEO chairperson o f the board leads to two effects on mix o f pay,
one positive and the other negative. If the CEO becomes chair to exploit increased
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knowledge, salary increases and mix declines. However, the resulting increase in decision
rights increases monitoring difficulty, and hence increases mix.
If inside directors have incentives to maximize value, and are more informed about
the firms circumstances and the CEOs’ actions than are outside directors, then the
insiders’ direct monitoring is a substitute for increased mix. This implies a negative
relation between mix and BDINSIDE.
Direct ownership by the CEO reduces the need for performance related
compensation. Blockholders, both inside and outside, have incentives to acquire
knowledge about the firm’s environment and the actions o f the CEO. Therefore,
ownership by the CEO and other large holders are substitutes for increased mix o f pay. I
predict that CEOOWN, INSOWN, AND OUTBLOCK are negatively related to mix. A
summary o f the predictions and explanations is presented below.
Variable

Prediction

Explanation

SIZE

+

Monitoring difficulty

GROWTH

+

Monitoring difficulty

VOLATILITY

7

Monitoring difficulty (+), compensation for risk (-)

LEVERAGE

-

Joint minimization o f manager, stockholder, bondholder
conflicts

CEOOLD

+

Horizon

CHAIR

?

Increased salary (•), relax decision rights (+)

BDSIZE

?

Prior studies, possible substitution effect (•)

(summary continued)
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Variable

Prediction

Explanation

BDINSIDE

-

Substitution effect

CEOOWN

-

Substitution effect

INSOWN

-

Substitution effect

OUTBLOCK

-

Substitution effect

4.4.2. Compensation equation (4.2)
The follow ing summ ary follows from section tw o. Efficiency argum ents imply
that, after controlling for IOS, mix o f pay and perform ance, board stru c tu re and
ow nership should have no effect on com pensation.

Variable

Prediction

Explanation

SIZE

+

Demand for higher quality management

GROWTH

+

Demand for higher quality management

VOLATILITY

+

Compensation for risk

ROA92

+

Pay for performance

CHAIR

0

Efficiency

BDSIZE

0

Efficiency

BDINSIDE

0

Efficiency

CEOOWN

0

Efficiency

INSOWN

0

Efficiency

OUTBLOCK

0

Efficiency
(sum m ary continued)
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Variable

Explanation

Prediction

MIX

+

Compensation for risk

PERF

+

Pay for performance

4.4.3. Performance equation (4.3)
The follow ing sum m ary follow s from section tw o. T h e essence o f the argum ent is
that, if board and ow nership structures are known, only determ inants o f expected returns
can affect future perform ance.

Variable

Explanation

Prediction

SIZE

-

Fama/French

GROWTH

-

Fama/French

VOLATILITY

0

Efficiency, asset pricing

BETA

+

Asset pricing

CHAIR

0

Efficiency

BDSIZE

0

Efficiency

BDINSIDE

0

Efficiency

CEOOWN

0

Efficiency

INSOWN

0

Efficiency

OUTBLOCK

0

Efficiency

MIX

0

Efficiency
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4.5.

Descriptive statistics
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for selected variables. M ost o f the

results are similar to those reported by others. They are self descriptive, and hence I only
discuss results worth emphasizing. First, compensation is right skewed and has high
variability across firms. For example, total compensation ($000s) ranges from a minimum
o f 311.79 to 21,273. Incentive pay accounts for 66% (median) and 62% (mean) o f
compensation to the average CEO in S&P 500 firms. Option grant value is the largest
component o f CEO performance related compensation in firms in this sample.
Second, about 90% o f the firms in the sample have a CEO who also chairs the
board. About 78% o f the average board's members are outside directors. Both numbers
are slightly higher than numbers reported in other studies including Cyert et al. (1997)
and Core et al. (1999). Given economic Darwinism, such wide spread practices suggest
efficiency explanations. Third, CEO percentage ownership is very low; the mean is
0.75% and the median is 0.11%. This is similar to results in prior studies o f large
firms.

For example see Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Core et al. (1999).
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
N=I95
Endogenous V ariables

Mean

Median Std. Dev.

62.26

66.24

18.06

Compensation (000s)
Salary
Bonus
Long-term incentive pay
Restricted stock
Option grant value
Total compensation (COMP)

734.18
557.83
234.15
174.09
847.72
2787.41

700.0
427.09

427.2
2051.74

274.21
544.86
903.94
483.98
1596.9
2830.65

Performance, 1993 (PERF)

17.63

13.94

8918.08
1.76
7.54

21.85

Mix of Pay (MIX)

Min.
0.23

96.46

311.79

2507.69
4000
11306.25
4239.43
14488.60
21273.61

24.61

-42.54

116.96

3824.45
1.39
7.15

16713.60
1.05
2.35

181.80

130590

22.49
8.78
8.46
11.25
12.57

11.96

0

8.0

8.4
27.1
4.99

-2.09
-12.69
-39.99
-2.25

58.42
79.97
74.30
179.67
26.38

0
0

0.26
0.32

0
0

I
I

1
12
20

0.3
2.67
11.69

0
6

1
20

6.25

90

2.75
0.31
0.42

0
0
0

24.57

0
0

275

Max.

0
0
0
0

Predeterm ined V ariables
Investment Opportunity Set (IOS)
SIZE ($M)
GROWTH
VOL
Other
LR (%)
ROA
ROA92
PERF92
BETA* (using CRSP value weighted
index)
CEOOLD
REG
Board characteristics
CHAIR
BDSIZE
BDINSIDE
Ownership
CEOOWN (%)
INSOWN
OUTBLOCK

10.22

9.69
15.54
12.07
0.07
0.11

0.9
12.37
22.2

0.11
0
1

0.75
0.11

0.77

0.88

10.12

3.64

21.03

1
1

* BETA is the product o f estimated betas and CRSP 1993 value weighted market
return. The CRSP 1993 value weighted market return is 11.49.
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(table 3 continued)
MIX

=

COMP

=

PERF
SIZE
GROWTH

=
=
=

VOL
LR
ROA
ROA92
PERF92
BETA

=
=
=
=
=
=

CEOOLD
REG
CHAIR

=
=
=

BDSIZE
BDINSIDE
CEOOWN
INSOWN

=
=
=
=

OUTBLOCK

=

Percentage o f incentive compensation in total CEO compensation. That is, (total compensation
minus salary) divided by total compensation.
Total CEO Compensation. It includes salary and bonus, stock options, performance units.
performance shares and stock appreciation rights.
Market return for 1993 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
Sales for the year 1992.
Growth options for 1992 defined as (Market value of equity + book value of debtybook value o f
assets.
Standard deviation (in percentages) of monthly returns (measure of firm risk).
Leverage measure defined as (long term debt/total assets) for 1992.
ROA for the year 1993 (in percentages)
ROA for the year 1992 (in percentages)
Market return for 1992 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
(M arket beta from a one factor CAPM model calculated using 60 monthly returns prior to 1993)
multiplied by market return for 1993.
An indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 64 years or older.
An indicator variable that equals 1 when the linn is a regulated utility.
An indicator variable which equals 1 when the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0,
otherwise.
Number o f directors.
Percentage o f inside directors on the board.
Percentage ownership of CEO.
An indicator variable set to 1, when there is a non-CEO insider with Ownership o f 5% or more
or 0, otherwise.
An indicator variable set to 1, when there is an outsider (including Institutional owners) with
Ownership o f 5% or more or 0, otherwise.
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5.

Primary Results: Ordinary and two stage least squares
This section presents the primary results. These encompass ordinary least squares

and two stage least squares using the variables defined in section four. Section six
provides sensitivity analyses including using logs of some variables. Prior studies use
both raw and log specifications. The estimation on the raw variables seems more intuitive
and probably more consistent with the way people think about compensation. There are,
however, reasons for using a log specification. It mitigates the effect o f outliers through
scaling the data and it has an easy elasticity interpretation. I investigate the effect o f
using log-compensation and log-sales in section 6. Use of the regulation dummy is also
included in the sensitivity section.

5.1.

Model and estimation procedures
I use a three equation simultaneous system. The three equations in the system

are: mix o f pay, compensation and performance. The analysis is done in four steps. First,
I run OLS regressions for each o f the equations, without including mix o f pay on the
right hand side. This establishes the base case. Second, I include mix o f pay as an
explanatory variable in the compensation and performance equations. I then compare the
results from this model with those from the base model to evaluate the impact o f
addressing the correlated omitted variable problem without addressing endogeneity.
Third, I conduct the Hausman test for endogeneity, and show that MIX is endogenous.
Finally, I estimate the systems o f equations using two stages least squares (2SLS). I
compare the results from this model with those from the first two models to assess the
effect o f tackling both the correlated omitted variable and endogeneity problems.
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2SLS is used to estimate the systems o f equations because it has good small
sample properties; see Intriligator (1996). First, it is a consistent estimator. Second,
Monte Carlo studies find that, relative to 3SLS, FIML and other estimation techniques, it
has the lowest mean square error most o f the time. Third, it is not affected much by
misspecification and measurement errors.

5.2.

Ordinary least squares with raw variables
This subsection uses OLS on the three equations, both with and without the

endogenous mix of pay. Only raw variables are used Table 4 summarizes the OLS
results using raw variables. The results on the left are for the regressions that do not
include mix o f pay as an explanatory variable while the results on the right include mix of
pay.

5.2.1. Mix of pay
The mix of pay equation is well specified. The White statistic does not reject the
joint hypothesis that the equation is well specified and homoscedastic. Adjusted R2 is
0.13, with an F probability o f 0.0001. Mix o f pay is significantly positively related to
sales implying that larger firms tend to use more incentive based compensation. This is
similar to findings by Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and Gaver (1993), Cyert et al.
(1997) and Core et al. (1999).
The highly significant negative coefficient on leverage is consistent with the
hypothesis about monitoring by lenders and the role compensation contracts play in
resolving the agency problem between shareholders and debtholders. See John and John
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Table 4: Ordinary Least Squares Using Raw Variables
N=195
OLS Without Mix of Pay
E(Signs)*
Financial
INTERCEPT

?,?,?.?,?,?

SIZE
GROWTH
VOL

?,+,0,?,+,0

LR
ROA92

- +

PERF92

~+~~

OLS With Mix of Pay

MIX

COMP

PERF

MIX

COMP

PERF

57.83

215,542

35.37

57.83

18.97

(0 .0001 )
0.00014
(0.0376)
1.38
(0.1587)
-0.20
(0.7182)
-0.35
(0 .0012 )

(0.8943)
35.46
(0.0026)
148,565
(0.3417)
-5,752
(0.5236)

(0.0078)
0.00025
(0.9933)
-5.51
(0.0005)
4.19
(0 .0001 )

(0 .0001 )
0.00014
(0.0376)
1.38
(0.1587)
-0.20
(0.7182)
-0.35
(0 .0012 )

4,528,796
(0 .0011 )
20.99
(0.0190)
-271,219
(0.8228)
65,323
(0.1998)

+,~

14,200
(0.3473)
9,649
(0.0724)

1,321
(0.4884)
23,546
(0 .0021 )

-1.79
(0.9999)

-1.70
(0.9999)

BETA
9.91
(0.0267)

CEOOLD
Board
CHAIR

?,0 .0 ,?.0.0

BDSIZE

?,0 ,0 ,?,0,0

BDINSIDE

-,0 ,0 .-,0.0

Ownership
CEOOWN

-.0 ,0 ,-,0,0

INSOWN

-.0 ,0 ,-,0,0

OUTBLOCK

-,0,0,-0,0

9.91
(0.0267)

5.32
(0.2042)
0.23
(0.6333)
-0.059
(0.2926)

226,107
(0.7366)
122,142
(0.1310)
-5,754
(0.7429)

-4.41
(0.4197)
-1.64
(0.0116)
0.135
(0.3401)

5.32
(0.2042)
0.23
(0.6333)
-0.059
(0.2926)

-216,432
(0.6867)
90,333
(0.1606)
-754
(0.9569)

-5.71
(0.2818)
-1.69
(0.0075)
0.145
(0.2904)

- 1.66
(0.0006)
4.28
(0.8588)
4.84
(0.9424)

-54,270
(0.4758)
1,070,601
(0.0996)
-3,527
(0.9944)

0.586
(0.3432)
1.56
(0.7645)
-0.72
(0.8570)

- 1.66
(0.0006)
4.28
(0.8588)
4.84
(0.9424)

0.13

0.08
0.0069
0.8194

0.20

0.13

1.093
(0.0758)
-0.094
(0.9851)
-2.157
(0.5808)
0.334
(0 .0002)
0.25

0.0001
0.4307

0.0001

80,297
(0.1956)
691,369
(0.1818)
-320,765
(0.4219)
96,922
(0 .0000 )
0.42
0.0001
0.0487
0.0001

0.0002

MIX
Adjusted R2
P(F)
P(White)
P(Hausman: MIX)
PCHausman: PERF)

(0.1606)
0.00019
(0.9742)
-6.51
(0 .0001)
4.37
(0 .0001)

0.0001

0.5720

0.5720

0.0001

0.0477

0.3085

* The ? and ~ in predicted signs represent no prediction and the variable is not in the
model. The reported numbers are coefficient estimates and probabilities. Probabilities
are one-tail when the prediction is directional and two-tail otherwise.
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(table 4 continued)
MIX

=

COMP

=

PERF
SIZE
GROWTH

=

VOL
LR
ROA
ROA92
PERF92
BETA

=
=

CEOOLD
REG
CHAIR

=

BDSIZE
BDINSIDE
CEOOWN
INSOWN

=

OUTBLOCK

=

=
=

=
=
=
=
=
=

=
=

Percentage o f incentive compensation in total CEO compensation. That is, (total compensation
minus salary) divided by total compensation.
Total CEO Compensation. It includes salary and bonus, stock options, performance units.
performance shares and stock appreciation rights.
Market return for 1993 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
Sales for the year 1992.
Growth options for 1992 defined as (Market value o f equity + book value o f debtybook value of
assets.
Standard deviation (in percentages) of monthly returns (measure of firm risk).
Leverage measure defined as (long term debt/total assets) for 1992.
ROA for the year 1993 (in percentages)
ROA for the year 1992 (in percentages)
Market return for 1992 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
(Market beta from a one factor CAPM model calculated using 60 monthly returns prior to 1993
) multiplied by market return for 1993.
An indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 64 years or older.
An indicator variable that equals 1 when the firm is a regulated utility.
An indicator variable which equals 1 when the CEO is also the chairman o f the board and 0,
otherwise.
Number o f directors.
Percentage o f inside directors on the board.
Percentage ownership of CEO.
An indicator variable set to 1, when there is a non-CEO insider with Ownership of 5% or more
or 0, otherwise.
An indicator variable set to 1, when there is an outsider (including Institutional owners) with
Ownership o f 5% or more or 0, otherwise.
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(1993) and John and Senbet (1998). The dummy variable CEOOLD is significantly
positive. This accords with the assertions by Jensen and Murphy (1990) about the
horizon problem that arises as the CEO approaches retirement. The threat o f dismissal
becomes less effective as a motivational device, so firms increase use o f other incentive
devices.
The CHAIR variable is insignificant. Mix o f pay is negatively related to CEO
ownership, suggesting that CEO ownership and use o f incentive contracts are substitute
mechanisms to align the interests of the CEO with those of shareholders. This is
consistent with findings by Mehran (1995), and Core et al. (1999). None o f the other
board and ownership variables are significant. Overall mix o f pay is significantly related
to size, leverage, the CEOs proximity to retirement and CEO ownership.

5.2.2. Compensation
The model without mix o f pay is well specified, and the F statistic is significant.
The White statistic does not reject the joint hypothesis that the model is well specified
and homoscedastic. Consistent with findings by Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and
Gaver (1993), Cyert et al. (1997) and Core et al. (1999), I find a strong positive
relationship between compensation and size. Because larger firms require higher quality
CEOs with high marginal productivity, they pay higher compensation. Compensation is
also positively related to performance This finding is similar to results in Murphy
(1985), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Cyert et al. (1997), and Core et al. (1999) among
others.
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The board and ownership variables, except for INSOWN and BDSIZE, are all
insignificant. The marginal significance o f INSOWN and BDSIZE are inconsistent with
the predictions of efficient contracting. Broadly, the result is consistent with efficiency
arguments that governance mechanisms are optimally chosen by firms. Caution,
however, is in order in drawing strong conclusions from these findings as there is a yet to
be addressed correlated omitted variable and endogeneity problem.
Comparing the compensation regression with and without MIX as a regressor,
the significance o f SIZE, PERF92, INSOWN and BDSIZE declines somewhat. The
decline in the significance o f INSOWN and BDSIZE is a move in the direction o f
efficient contracting predictions. MIX is significantly positively related to compensation.
There are no changes o f consequence to other coefficients. R2 increases substantially
from 0.08 to 0.42. However, the White test rejects the joint hypothesis that the model is
well specified and homoscedastic and the Hausman test rejects the hypothesis that MIX
is predetermined. These two specification tests are consistent with the efficiency
arguments in section two that MIX is an omitted endogenous variable.

5.2.3. Performance
Superficially, some o f the results in the performance equation are puzzling. SIZE,
GROWTH, VOL, BETA and BDSIZE are significantly related to performance. The sign
o f the coefficient on BETA is inconsistent with Sharpe/Lintner/Black style asset pricing
models. Ignoring asset pricing issues, the other significant coefficients are inconsistent
with semi-strong form informational efficiency. However, we cannot ignore asset pricing
issues. Fama and French (1992) find that variables such as size, growth, and earnings
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price ratio are related to mean returns over large samples and many time periods. The
anomalous findings above are consistent with these broader deficiencies in current asset
pricing models. Until such issues are resolved in finance, asset pricing and efficiency
issues are inextricably intertwined. None o f the other board and ownership variables is
significant when MIX is excluded.
The parameter estimates in the foregoing performance equation are, however,
biased and inconsistent if there is a correlated omitted variable and/or endogeneity
problem. Mix o f pay is one variable that theory suggests should be included in the
performance equation. I investigate the effect o f adding mix o f pay next.
Focusing on the performance equation including MIX, there are few changes o f
note. The coefficient on CEO ownership becomes marginally significant and MIX is
highly significant. As in the compensation equation, the White and Hausman tests reject
the specification; MIX is endogenous. In the two stage least squares estimation in the
next subsection, MIX becomes insignificant. Accounting for asset pricing anomalies, the
results from the performance equation are broadly consistent with efficiency, although
the BDSIZE result is a puzzle.

5.3.

Two stage least squares using raw variables
The mix o f pay equation is identical to that using OLS. Overall, the results for

compensation and performance are similar to the OLS results discussed above.
The White and Hausman tests accompanying the OLS results in section 5.2
establish that MIX is endogenous. Results from estimating the model as a system using
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2SLS are presented in Table 5. Estimation o f a simultaneous system requires that the
system is identified. Identification restrictions raise the issue o f whether exclusion of
predetermined variables from equations is correct (or reasonable). The identifying
restrictions are driven by the efficiency theory; Basmann’s (1960) test does not reject the
overidentifying restrictions.19 The results from 2SLS are similar to those from OLS
(including mix) above. In the compensation equation, the coefficient on MIX declines
somewhat, but is still significant. The coefficient on volatility has the predicted positive
sign and is marginally significant. Though the significance o f INSOWN increases a bit, it
is still less significant than it was in the OLS model that excludes mix o f pay. BDSIZE
becomes even more insignificant in the compensation equation when endogeneity is
addressed.
In contrast to compensation, the use o f 2SLS has important effects on the
performance equation. Significant coefficients on governance variables in prior studies
probably stem from failure to properly include the endogenous mix o f pay. Using 2SLS,
CEOOWN and MIX are no longer significant. Addressing endogeneity is crucial.
However, the asset pricing difficulties remain as does the puzzling significant coefficient
on BDSIZE.

19 The null hypothesis in Basmann’s (1960) test is that the predetermined variables not appearing in

any equation have zero coefficients.

62

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 5: Two Stage Least Squares Using Raw Variables
N=195
2SLS With Raw Variables
E(Signs)*
Financial
INTERCEPT

?,?.?

SIZE
GROWTH
VOL

?,+,0

LR

MIX

COMP

PERF

57.83
(0.0001)
0.00014
(0.033)
1.38
(0.1587)
-0.20
(0.7182)
-0.35

-3,341,641
(0.1912)
27.084
(0.0278)
-249,114
(0.7830)
98,458
(0.1361)

29.56
(0.1643)

0.0002
(0.9766)
-5.87
(0.0012)
4.25
(0.0001)

0.0012
ROA92

20,509
(0.3341)

~ ,+ ,~

-1.73
(0.9999)

BETA
CEOOLD

+

Board
CHAIR

7.0.0

BDSIZE

7.0.0

BDINSIDE

-.0,0

Ownership
CEOOWN

-.0.0

INSOWN

-.0.0

OUTBLOCK

-.0.0

MIX

~.+,0

PERF

~ .+ ,~

~

Adjusted R2
P(F)
P(Over-identified)

~

9.91
(0.0267)
5.32
(0.2042)
0.23
(0.6333)
-0.059
(0.2926)

-130,807
(0.8236)
80,517
(0.3121)
-153.39
(0.9918)

-4.87
(0.3786)
-1.66
(0.0097)
0.139
(0.3205)

-1.66
(0.0006)
4.28
(0.8588)
4.84
(0.9424)

36,335
(0.6518)
885,218
(0.1211)
-125,287
(0.7761)
71,843
(0.0207)
649.21
(0.4915)
0.09
0.0025
0.6482

0.76
(0.3382)
0.97
(0.8566)
-1.23
(0.7698)

0.13

0.0001
0.4325

0.12
(0.7294)

0.20
0.0001
0.2212

* The ? and ~ in predicted signs represent no prediction and the variable is not in the
model. The reported numbers are coefficient estimates and probabilities. Probabilities
are one-tail when the prediction is directional and two-tail otherwise.
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(table 5 continued)
MIX

=

COMP

=

PERF
SIZE
GROWTH

=
=
=

VOL
LR
ROA
ROA92
PERF92
BETA

=
=
=
=
=

CEOOLD
REG
CHAIR

=
=
=

BDSIZE
BDINSIDE
CEOOWN
INSOWN
OUTBLOCK

=

=
=

=
=
=

Percentage of incentive compensation in total CEO compensation. That is, (total compensation
minus salary) divided by total compensation.
Total CEO Compensation. It includes salary and bonus, stock options, performance units.
performance shares and stock appreciation rights.
M arket return for 1993 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
Sales for the year 1992.
Growth options for 1992 defined as (M arket value of equity + book value of debtybook value of
assets.
Standard deviation (in percentages) o f monthly returns (measure o f firm risk).
Leverage measure defined as (long term debt/total assets) for 1992.
ROA for the year 1993 (in percentages)
ROA for the year 1992 (in percentages)
Market return for 1992 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
(M arket beta from a one factor CAPM model calculated using 60 monthly returns prior to 1993
) multiplied by market return for 1993.
An indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 64 years or older.
An indicator variable that equals 1 when the firm is a regulated utility.
An indicator variable which equals 1 when the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0,
otherwise.
Number of directors.
Percentage of inside directors on the board.
Percentage ownership of CEO.
An indicator variable set to 1, when there is a non-CEO insider with Ownership of 5% or more
or 0, otherwise.
An indicator variuble set to 1, when there is an outsider (including Institutional owners) with
Ownership of 5% or more or 0, otherwise.
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6.

Sensitivity Analysis
For purposes o f comparability with prior research and testing the robustness o f

results, several sensitivity analyses are reported.

6.1.

Ordinary and two stage least squares with log variables
Results from OLS and 2SLS estimation using logs o f compensation and size are

in Tables 6 and 7. The overall flavor o f the findings is similar to those with the raw
variables discussed in section five. Signs and significance o f coefficients, the results o f
specification and endogeneity tests, and the use o f 2SLS generate conclusions that are
unchanged from section five. Few changes o f note are: GROW becomes more significant
in the mix o f pay equation; VOL is highly significant in the compensation equation (and
has the predicted sign) and ROA92 becomes marginally significant (and has the predicted
sign) in the performance equation.

6.2.

Ordinary and two stage least squares with a regulation dummy
Tables eight and nine replicate the primary results in tables four and five

respectively with the addition o f a dummy variable for regulated utilities. The coefficient
on the regulation dummy is only significant in compensation regressions when there is no
control for mix o f pay. That is, when the variable the theory predicts is relevant is
omitted, one finds a spurious significant negative coefficient on the regulation dummy.
The coefficient on REG is significantly negative in the mix o f pay equation. This is
consistent with restrictions imposed by regulation causing managers o f regulated firms to
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have fewer decision rights; see Smith and Watts (1992) and Christie, Joye and Watts
(1999). Other unreported results show that no other industry dummies matter.

6.3.

Variable definitions and proxies
A variety o f variations on variable measures are investigated. The variations used

include: (1) An alternative measure o f incentive compensation that includes only stock
based and long-term components o f compensation in the numerator; (2) book value o f
assets instead o f sales as a measure o f size; (3) log o f BDSIZE. The results from these
variations are not reported in detail, since they do not change the tenor o f the
conclusions.
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Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares Using Log Variables
N=195
OLS Without Mix of Pay
E(Signs)*
Financial
INTERCEPT

?.?.?,?,?,?

SIZE
GROWTH
VOL

?,+,0,?,+,0

LR

MIX

COMP

PERF

MIX

COMP

PERF

25.44
(0.0708)
4.16
(0.0003)

11.65
(0.0001)
0.28
(0.0000)

16.35
(0.3735)
2.56
(0.9372)
-5.43
(0.0007)
4.46
(0.0001)

25.44
(0.0708)
4.16
(0.0003)

11.14
(0.0001)
0.15
(0.0000)
-0.05
(0.8488)
0.027
(0.0188)

11.85
(0.5054)

2.10

0.12

(0.0626)
0.09
(0.8683)
-0.31
(0.0037)

(0.0845)
0.016
(0.2379)

ROA92

0.001

PERF92

(0.4524)
0.0047
(0.0064)
+ ,~ ~ +

BETA

OLS With Mix of Pay

2.10
(0.0626)
0.09
(0.8683)
-0.31
(0.0037)

0.88
(0.7014)
-6.72
(0.0000)
4.37
(0.0001)

0.008
(0.0754)
0.0009
(0.1983)
-1.82
0.9999

-1.84
0.9999

CEOOLD

+ ,~ , ~ + , ~ ~

10.55
(0.0175)

Board
CHAIR

?.0,0,?.0,0

4.41
(0.2809)
-0.16
(0.7436)
-0.06
(0.2773)

(0.1908)
-0.003
(0.8854)
-0.002
(0.6863)

-5.03
(0.3620)
-1.66
(0.0150)
0.155
(0.2799)

4.41
(0.2809)
-0.16
(0.7436)
-0.06
(0.2773)

0.08
(0.3513)
-0.0003
(0.9812)
-0.00003
(0.9891)

-6.22
(0.2450)
-1.56
(0.0188)
0.166
(0.2289)

-1.59
(0.0007)
4.81
(0.8916)
4.91
(0.9493)

-0.024
(0.1587)
0.19
(0.2013)
0.035
(0.7525)

0.60
(0.3375)
1.16
(0.8255)
-1.07
(0.7921)

-1.59
(0.0007)
4.81
(0.8916)
4.91
(0.9493)

0.17

0.18

0.17

1.07
(0.0837)
-0.71
(0.8893)
-2.65
(0.5013)
0.35
(0.0003)
0.23

0.0001

0.22
0.0001

0.014
(0.1587)
0.049
(0.5724)
-0.06
(0.3415)
0.030
(0.0000)
0.74

0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

0.7648

0.6305

0.3352

0.7648

0.8145

0.0668

0.0001

0.0002

BDSIZE

?,0.0,?.0,0

BDINSIDE

- ,0 ,0 ,- .0 ,0

Ownership
CEOOWN

- ,0 ,0 ,- .0 ,0

INSOWN

-,0,0,-,0,0

OUTBLOCK

-,0,0,-,0,0

MIX

~ , ~ , ~ , ~ , + ,o

Adjusted R*
P(F)
P(White)
P(Hausman: MIX)
P(Hausman: PERF)

10.55
(0.0175)

0.20

0.1734

* The ? and ~ in predicted signs represent no prediction and the variable is not in the
model. The reported numbers are coefficient estimates and probabilities. Probabilities
are one-tail when the prediction is directional and two-tail otherwise.
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(table

6

continued)

MIX
COMP

=

PERF
SIZE
GROWTH

=
=

VOL
LR
ROA
ROA92
PERF92
BETA

=
=
=
=
=
=

CEOOLD
REG
CHAIR

=
=
=

BDSIZE
BDINSIDE
CEOOWN
INSOWN

=
=
=
=

OUTBLOCK

=

=

Percentage o f incentive compensation in total CEO compensation. That is, (total compensation
minus salary) divided by total compensation.
Total CEO Compensation. It includes salary and bonus, stock options, performance units.
performance shares and stock appreciation rights.
Market return for 1993 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
Sales for the year 1992.
Growth options for 1992 defined as (Market value o f equity + book value of debtybook value of
assets.
Standard deviation (in percentages) of monthly returns (measure o f firm risk).
Leverage measure defmed as (long term debt/total assets) for 1992.
ROA for the year 1993 (in percentages)
ROA for the year 1992 (in percentages)
Market return for 1992 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
(Market beta from a one factor CAPM model calculated using 60 monthly returns prior to 1993
) multiplied by market return for 1993.
An indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 64 years or older.
An indicator variable that equals 1 when the lin n is a regulated utility.
An indicator variable which equals 1 when the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0,
otherwise.
Number of directors.
Percentage o f inside directors on the board.
Percentage ownership of CEO.
An indicator variable set to 1, when there is a non-CEO insider with Ownership of 5% or more
or 0, otherwise.
An indicator variable set to 1, when there is an outsider (including Institutional owners) with
Ownership o f 5% or more or 0, otherwise.
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Table 7: Two Stage Least Squares Using Log Variables
N=195
2SLS With Log Variables
E(Signs)*
Financial
INTERCEPT

?,?,?

SIZE

MIX

COMP

PERF

25.44
(0.0708)
4.16
(0.0003)

11.17
(0.0001)
0.185
(0.0000)
-0.025
(0.6649)
0.031
(0.0195)

13.61
(0.4613)
1.54
(0.7398)
-6.22
(0.0019)
4.411
(0.0001)

2.10

GROWTH
VOL

?,+.o

LR

-,~,~

ROA92

~,+,~

(0.0626)
0.09
(0.8683)
-0.31
(0.0037)

0.009
(0.1364)
-1.82
(0.9999)

BETA
10.55
(0.0175)

CEOOLD
Board
CHAIR

?.0,0

BDSIZE

?.o,o

BDINSIDE

-.0,0

Ownership
CEOOWN

-.0.0

INSOWN

-.0,0

OUTBLOCK

-.0,0

MIX

~,+,o

4.41
(0.2809)
-0.16
(0.7436)
-0.062
(0.2773)

0.108
(0.2846)
-0.0027
(0.8374)
-0.00024
(0.9250)

-5.76
(0.2965)
-1.60
(0.0179)
0.162
(0.2467)

-1.59
(0.0007)
4.81
(0.8916)
4.91
(0.9493)

0.0051
(0.7134)
0.09
(0.3545)
-0.0252
(0.7432)

0.8920
(0.2586)

0.2130
(0.5624)

0.17

0.024
(0.0002)
0.00082
(0.4337)
0.46

0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

0.5875

0.7252

0.1685

PERF
Adjusted R2
P(F)
P(Over-identified)

0.02
(0.9971)
-2.0345
(0.6347)

0.19

* The ? and ~ in predicted signs represent no prediction and the variable is not in the
model. The reported numbers are coefficient estimates and probabilities. Probabilities
are one-tail when the prediction is directional and two-tail otherwise.
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(table 7 continued)
MIX

= Percentage o f incentive compensation in total CEO compensation. That is, (total compensation

COMP

= Total CEO Compensation. It includes salary and bonus, stock options, performance units.

PERF
SIZE
GROWTH

=

VOL
LR
ROA
ROA92
PERF92
BETA

=
=
=
=

CEOOLD
REG
CHAIR

=
=
=

minus salary) divided by total compensation.

BDSIZE
BDINSIDE
CEOOWN
INSOWN
OUTBLOCK

=

=
=
=

=

=
=

=
=

performance shares and stock appreciation rights.
Market return for 1993 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
Sales for the year 1992.
Growth options for 1992 defined as (Market value of equity + book value o f debtybook value of
assets.
Standard deviation (in percentages) o f monthly returns (measure o f firm risk).
Leverage measure defined as (long term debt/total assets) for 1992.
ROA for the year 1993 (in percentages)
ROA for the year 1992 (in percentages)
Market return for 1992 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
(Market beta from a one factor CAPM model calculated using 60 monthly returns prior to 1993
) multiplied by market return for 1993.
An indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 64 years or older.
An indicator variable that equals 1 when the firm is a regulated utility.
An indicator variable which equals 1 when the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0,
otherwise.
Number o f directors.
Percentage o f inside directors on the board.
Percentage ownership of CEO.
An indicator variable set to 1, when there is a non-CEO insider with Ownership of 5% or more
or 0, otherwise.
An indicator variable set to 1, when there is an outsider (including Institutional owners) with
Ownership o f 5 % or more or 0, otherwise.
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Table 8: Ordinary Least Squares Using Raw Variables with Regulation Dummy
N=195
OLS Without Mix of Pay
E(Signs)*
Financial
INTERCEPT

?,?,?,?,?,?

SIZE
GROWTH
VOL

?,+,0,?,+,0

LR

MIX

COMP

PERF

68.78
(0.0001)
0.00008
(0.1576)
0.43
(0.3740)
-1.03
(0.0784)
-0.25
(0.0140)

1,620,134
(0.3427)
27.97
(0.0147)
-61,301
(0.5658)
-97,367
(0.8272)

40.65
(0.0041)
0.00023
(0.9845)
-6.02
(0.0003)
4.02
(0.0001)

10,784
(0.4053)
25,559
(0.0009)

ROA92
PERF92

~ +,~ ~,+ ~

BETA

~ ~ +~ ~ +

CEOOLD
REG
Board
CHAIR

?,0.0 ,?,0,0

BDSIZE

?.0.0 .?,0.0

BDINSIDE

-,0 ,0 .-,0,0

Ownership
CEOOWN

-,0 .0,-.0.0

INSOWN

-,0,0,-,0,0

OUTBLOCK

-.0,0, -.0,0

OLS With Mix of Pay
MIX

68.78
-4,959,038
(0.0001) (0.0014)
0.00008
22.38
(0.1576) (0.0154)
0.43
-232,630
(0.3740) (0.7814)
-1.03
87,959
(0.0784) (0.1516)
-0.25
(0.0140)
12,323
(0.3673)
8.871.80
(0.0939)

PERF
18.95
(0.2055)
0.00019
(0.9718)
-6.51
(0.0000)
4.37
(0.0001)

-1.79
(0.9999)

-1.82
(0.9999)

-6.58
(0.2710)

8.37
(0.0457)
-16.63
(0.0001)

391.243
(0.2618)

(0.9974)

189,816
(0.7749)
125,641
(0.1157)
-7,441.36
(0.6678)

-4.40
(0.4204)
-1.64
(0.0116)
0.130
(0.3598)

4.65
(0.2509)
0.219
(0.6469)
-0.065
(0.2671)

•218,181
(0.6848)
88,806
(0.1688)
-253.43
(0.9856)

-5.7149
(0.2832)
-1.69
(0.0076)
0.14
(0.2921)

-52,932
(0.4812)
964,455
(0.1336)
-224,273
(0.6553)

0.59
(0.3332)
1.25
(0.8099)
-1.45
(0.7205)

-1.65
(0.0004)
3.73
(0.8336)
2.71
(0.8157)

0.19

0.10

0.19

1.093582
(0.0770)
-0.094001
(0.9852)
-2.155549
(0.5859)
0.33
(0.0006)
0.24

0.0001

0.0016
0.9999

0.20
0.0001

83,054
(0.1825)
707,087
(0.1733)
-277,345
(0.4942)
99,128
(0.0000)
0.41

0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

0.2883

0.8191

0.2645

0.0547
0.0003

8.37
(0.0457)
-16.63 -1.705,406
(0.0001) (0.0088)
4.65
(0.2509)
0.219
(0.6469)
-0.065
(0.2671)
-1.65
(0.0004)
3.73
(0.8336)
2.71
(0.8157)

MIX
Adjusted R2
P(F)
P(White)
P(Hausman: MIX)
PfHausman: PERF)

COMP

0.8191

0.0001

0.02

0.3138

* The ? and ~ in predicted signs represent no prediction and the variable is not in the
model. The reported numbers are coefficient estimates and probabilities. Probabilities are
one-tail when the prediction is directional and two-tail otherwise.
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(table 8 continued)
MIX

=

COMP

=

PERF
SIZE
GROWTH

=
=
=

VOL
LR
ROA
ROA92
PERF92
BETA

=

CEOOLD
REG
CHAIR

=

BDSiZE
BDINSIDE
CEOOWN
INSOWN

=

OUTBLOCK

=

=

=
=

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

Percentage o f incentive compensation in total CEO compensation. That is, (total compensation
minus salary) divided by total compensation.
Total CEO Compensation. It includes salary and bonus, stock options, performance units.
performance shares and stock appreciation rights.
Market return for 1993 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
Sales for the year 1992.
Growth options for 1992 defined as (Market value o f equity + book value of debtybook value of
assets.
Standard deviation (in percentages) of monthly returns (measure of firm risk).
Leverage measure defined as (long term debt/total assets) for 1992.
ROA for the year 1993 (in percentages)
ROA for the year 1992 (in percentages)
Market return for 1992 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
(M arket beta from a one factor CAPM model calculated using 60 monthly returns prior to 1993
) multiplied by market return for 1993.
An indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 64 years or older.
An indicator variable that equals 1 when the linn is a regulated utility.
An indicator variable which equals 1 when the CEO is also the chairman o f the board and 0,
otherwise.
Number o f directors.
Percentage o f inside directors on the board.
Percentage ownership of CEO.
An indicator variable set to I, when there is a non-CEO insider with Ownership o f 5 % or more
or 0, otherwise.
An indicator variable set to 1, when there is an outsider (including Institutional owners) with
Ownership o f 5% or more or 0, otherwise.
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Table 9: Two Stage Least Squares Using Raw Variables with Regulation Dummy
N=195
2SLS With Raw Variables
E(Signs)*
Financial
INTERCEPT

?,?,?

SIZE
GROWTH
VOL

?,+,0

LR

- ~,~

ROA92

~,+

MIX

COMP

PERF

68.7813
(0.0001)
0.00007
(0.1576)
0.4359
(0.374)
-1.039
(0.0784)
-0.2554
(0.014)

-3434127
(0.3415)
26.4301
(0.0207)
-258728
(0.7997)
95360
(0.1989)

51.3520
(0.1602)

21869
(0.3235)
-1.8389
(0.9999)

BETA
CEOOLD

0.0002
(0.9784)
-5 7811
(0.0015)
3.85359
(0.0008)

+,~.~

REG
Board
CHAIR

7.0.0

BDSIZE

7.0,0

BDINSIDE

-.0.0

Ownership
CEOOWN

-.0.0

INSOWN

-.0.0

OUTBLOCK

-.0.0

MIX

-.+,0

PERF

~,+,o

Adjusted R2
P(F)
P(Over-identified)

8.3780
(0.0457)
-16.639
(0.0001)

-31564
(0.4891)

-9.8444
(0.4096)

4.6506
(0.2509)
0.2190
(0.6469)
-0.0653
(0.2671)

-132217
(0.8282)
82009
(0.3034)
-295.2674
(0.9845)

-3.7621
(0.5332)
-1.6254
(0.0172)
0.1227
(0.4130)

-1.6599
(0.0004)
3.7331
(0.8336)
2.7135
(0.8157)

38360
(0.6974)
872069
(0.1261)
-132574
(0.7624)
73463
(0.0732)
1763.8799

0.3540
(0.7227)
1.9197
(0.7413)
-1.1116
(0.7993)
-0.1651
(0.7489)

0.1878

(0.4761)
0.1070

0.1776

0.0001

0.0012

0.0001

0.9977

0.6376

0.348 3

* The ? and ~ in predicted signs represent no prediction and the variable is not in the
model. The reported numbers are coefficient estimates and probabilities. Probabilities
are one-tail when the prediction is directional and two-tail otherwise.
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(table 9 continued)
MIX
COMP
PERF
SIZE
GROWTH
VOL
LR
ROA
ROA92
PERF92
BETA
CEOOLD
REG
CHAIR
BDSIZE
BDINSIDE
CEOOWN
INSOWN
OUTBLOCK

=

Percentage o f incentive compensation in total CEO compensation. That is, (total compensation
minus salary) divided by total compensation.
= Total CEO Compensation. It includes salary and bonus, stock options, performance units.
performance shares and stock appreciation rights.
= Market return for 1993 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
= Sales for the year 1992.
= Growth options for 1992 defined as (Market value of equity + book value of debtybook value of
assets.
= Standard deviation (in percentages) o f monthly returns (measure o f firm risk).
= Leverage measure defined as (long term debt/total assets) for 1992.
= ROA for the year 1993 (in percentages)
= ROA for the year 1992 (in percentages)
= Market return for 1992 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
= (Market beta from a one factor CAPM model calculated using 60 monthly returns prior to 1993
) multiplied by market return for 1993.
= An indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 64 years or older.
= An indicator variable that equals 1 when the firm is a regulated utility.
= An indicator variable which equals 1 when the CEO is also the chairman o f the board and 0,
otherwise.
= Number of directors.
= Percentage o f inside directors on the board.
= Percentage ownership of CEO.
= An indicator variable set to 1, when there is a non-CEO insider with Ownership of 5% or more
or 0, otherwise.
= An indicator variable set to 1, when there is an outsider (including Institutional owners) with
Ownership of 5% or more or 0, otherwise.

74

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

7.

Summary and Conclusions
This paper integrates and extends prior studies on compensation, performance

and mix o f pay. Both theory and evidence are enhanced. There are two views o f agency
relations that are not mutually exclusive. The first is that managers behave
opportunistically because there are no effective mechanisms to constrain their behavior.
The second is that competitive pressures induce managers to maximize the value o f the
firm. This view reflects economic Darwinism; economic survival requires discovering
efficient ways to manage the firm. This approach is known as efficient contracting and
assumes that managers, shareholders, the board o f directors and bondholders have
incentives to equate marginal costs and marginal benefits.
Theories based on efficient contracting imply strong testable restrictions on
agency relations associated with the firm. Theories based on opportunism are less
restrictive, since there are myriad ways that opportunism can occur. While these two
views o f the firm are not mutually exclusive, it is useful to think o f them as extremes.
The theory in section two incorporates the agency relation o f stockholders with
debtholders into the analysis, and develops implications o f efficient contracting that have
been largely ignored in empirical work. An important implication o f efficient contracting
is that all agency relations, ownership, and governance mechanisms within the firm
should be treated jointly. First, those implications are used in section three to show that
some prior results are mutually contradictory and inconsistent with efficiency. Second,
the study jointly estimates relations among mix o f pay, executive compensation,
performance,

ownership,

and board

structure

using a simultaneous
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equations

methodology. Table 10 provides a succinct summary o f predictions and results on
ownership, board structure and mix o f pay.
The results support the implication o f efficient contracting that it is necessary to
approach agency relations simultaneously. When this is done, the results are broadly
consistent with the restrictions implied by efficient contracting. ^0 The only exception is
related to board size. None o f the other board and ownership variables is significant,
consistent with the prediction that in an efficient market firms choose optimal
combinations o f available governance mechanisms.
Important detailed contributions are:
1.

The relation between stockholders and debtholders affects the relation between
managers and stockholders. Financial leverage has a significant effect on mix of
pay.

2.

Mix o f pay is an omitted variable in many prior studies. Evidence is provided that
mix of pay is also endogenous.

3.

The direct effect of regulation on compensation reported in prior studies is
spurious. The evidence provided shows that this effect is caused by omitting mix
o f pay from the compensation equation.

2® There are some other anomalous results, but these are not peculiar to agency studies, and are
consistent with known failures of simple asset pricing models.
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Table 10: Predictions from Efficient Contracting and Results Using Two Stage
Least Squares
Variables

Ownership Structure
CEO ownership
Inside ownership
Outside blockholders
Board Structure
Percentage of insiders
CEO chairs board
Board size

Mix of Pay

Compensation

Performance

E(Sign)

Result

E(Sign)

Result

E(Sign)

Result

-

0
+

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0

+

+

0

0

-

-

?
?

Mix of Pay
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